

DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION DIRECTORATE
DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE COMMITTEE

2011 DAC REPORT ON MULTILATERAL AID

DAC Meeting, 30 June 2011

This document is submitted for DISCUSSION under Item 3 of the Draft Annotated DAC Agenda [DCD/DAC/A(2011)9].

For the purposes of the DAC discussion, Members are encouraged to focus on the broad findings and policy lessons outlined in the Executive Summary of this draft report. Note that initial emerging findings from the 2011 DAC Report on Multilateral Aid were initially presented and discussed at an informal meeting of DAC delegates on 20 May 2011. The current version of the report reflects these discussions.

Any additional written comments submitted to Emily Bosch (emily.bosch@oecd.org) by 22 July will be reflected in a revised version of the Report, which will be sent for DAC approval via written procedure in September 2011.

An Executive Summary of the draft report including the broad findings and policy lessons is available in French.

The document is only available in PDF.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This third *DAC Report on Multilateral Aid* provides the latest trends on members' multilateral development assistance and delves deeper into why and how governments invest in multilateral aid channels.

A. Trends in Multilateral Aid

1. In the last decade, multilateral ODA increased from USD 26.6 billion in 2000 to USD 36.2 billion in 2009. This represents an average annual growth rate of 3%, compared to 4% for total gross ODA.

2. Core multilateral contributions as a share of ODA fell to a low of 28% (USD 36 billion) in 2009 from a peak of 33% in 2001. An additional 12% (USD 15 billion) is earmarked by sector, country, region or theme and channelled through multilateral organisations, though scored as bilateral ODA. Together the two elements represent 40% of gross ODA, or USD 51 billion, an important sum that falls under a kaleidoscope of accountability arrangements.

3. Oversimplifying, the diverse reasons for allocating bilateral and multilateral aid can be condensed to the basic tension between, on the one hand, the desire for control and accountability over how resources are spent, and, on the other hand, the wider benefits of pooling resources, presence, and expertise. Recent research indicates that the principal-agent model may best explain the decisions involved in the choice of multilateralism. In this model, an individual donor (principal) and multilateral agency (agent) are pulled between the loss of control over funds and the benefits of burden sharing. How well the preferences of the agent align with those of the principal will often determine the degree to which this loss of control is a preoccupation for that donor.

4. Earmarked funding through multilateral organisations is growing faster than other components of ODA. There are strong rationales behind this trend, introduced in last year's report. It allows donors to track results more easily, to have greater say over specific uses, and to raise their contributions' visibility to domestic constituencies. Several donors have also decided to concentrate their bilateral aid on fewer partner countries. This encourages them to channel funds through multilaterals to maintain a minimum attributable footprint in a specific region. Some DAC members refer to these phenomena as the growing "multilateralisation" of bilateral aid. At the same time, multilateral organisations may legitimately perceive this as a growing "bilateralisation" of multilateral aid.

Forward-looking trends


5. According to donors' forward spending surveys, almost two-thirds of countries in all regions are projected to receive lower aggregate levels of aid from both bilateral and multilateral channels by 2013 (98 countries out of 152). Within this, three-quarters of LDCs will see falls. Some of these predicted decreases may prove pessimistic, given high recent levels of uncertainty which can lead to abnormally cautious forward planning. Multilateral outflows, which tend to have a more even country distribution

than bilateral ones, can help mitigate this problem, but only to a limited extent, unless their resource base increases much faster than now appears likely.

DAC multilateral ODA shares

6. As seen in the figure below, Korea, Italy and Sweden have the largest proportion of multilateral as a share of gross ODA (29%, 28% and 26%), whereas Portugal, the United States and Greece provide the smallest proportion of aid multilaterally (12%, 12% and 11%).¹ While these figures alone cannot lead to any conclusions on donor preferences, donors closer to the right have relatively large bilateral programmes in place and/or provide very little non-EU multilateral development assistance. Countries represented on the left of the figure have relatively small bilateral programmes in place and/or provide a relatively large amount to non-EU multilateral agencies.

Figure 1. DAC multilateral ODA as % of gross ODA, excluding contributions to EU institutions, 2007-9 average (excluding debt relief)



Source: OECD DAC aggregate statistics, 2011.

Concentration on a few multilaterals

7. Data from 2009 confirm that DAC members concentrate a large portion (over 81%) of their core multilateral aid on five main clusters of multilaterals. They are the EDF + EU budget (37%), IDA (21%), UN Funds and Programmes (10%), the African and Asian Development Banks (5% + 3%), and the Global Fund (6%). This means that 18% of multilateral aid goes to the remaining 200+ multilateral organisations, many of which primarily provide technical assistance or serve a universal norm-setting purpose.

Non-DAC donors

8. Twenty non-DAC countries reported their aid flows to the DAC Secretariat in 2009, while some larger players (Brazil, the Russian Federation, China, and India) did not. The eleven non-DAC EU

¹ These shares also exclude debt relief.

member states provide 66% of their total ODA to multilaterals (including to EU institutions), while the average multilateral ODA of non-DAC donor states, excluding the Arab donors for which data is not comparable, is 31%. Larger regional players such as Brazil and the Russian Federation provide substantial multilateral aid to regional organisations or funds. It is unlikely that China and India provide a high share of multilateral aid: although they increasingly contribute to concessional funds like IDA, they already have large and rapidly growing bilateral programmes. This Report includes brief case studies of the Russian Federation and Brazil's multilateral aid.

B. Multilateral aid allocations-how countries decide.

9. A survey conducted at the end of 2010 asked DAC members to identify which ministries, departments or agencies are involved in deciding allocations to 29 different funds and organisations accounting for over 90% of all DAC multilateral allocations. The survey results are complemented by case studies on the decision-making process in France and the United Kingdom's *Multilateral Aid Review*.

Balance between bilateral and multilateral aid

10. Survey results indicate that just under half (11/23) of member countries explicitly discuss the balance between bilateral and multilateral aid allocations within their administrations at least every three to five years. The fact that there is little or no structured opportunity to “make the case” for multilateral aid in most DAC national settings inevitably means that citizens are only made aware in a relatively anecdotal way of the rationale for choosing alternative channels. In the current environment of budget constraints, articulating and publicising the national case for multilateralism is increasingly important to show the general public, legislators and civil society what they are getting in exchange for less direct control.

Decision-making models

11. Nine members adopt a “centralized model” whereby a single ministry, department or agency handles almost all aid allocation decisions to most multilateral organisations or funds. Allocation decisions are concentrated in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as in the case of the Nordic members and New Zealand or the department or agency for development for the UK and Australia. In contrast, fourteen members have at least two separate ministries, departments or agencies responsible for deciding allocations to these 29 different entities, and can be considered to adopt a more “decentralized model” in the sense that more than one ministry disburses aid. Coordination among lead ministries/agencies ranges from formal inter-ministerial bodies that meet regularly to *ad hoc* consultations between civil servants working on similar themes. Although EU institutions were not included in this component of the survey, their aid allocation model is closer to the decentralised model.

How donors allocate by sector: A closer look at health

12. In order to monitor donors' different aid modalities in the health sector, six broad health subcategories² were examined over a three-year period from 2007 to 2009. Together, nearly as much aid was delivered by multilateral organisations (41%) as was delivered bilaterally (44%) for the six health sub-categories identified in the report. The volume of bilateral aid for HIV/AIDS and sexually-transmitted diseases was twice the volume delivered multilaterally; however, taking out the contributions of just one donor, the United States, which has a very large bilateral HIV/AIDS programme makes the

² CRS purpose codes were grouped for the purpose of this exercise as explained in Annex C.

multilateral channel more important than the direct bilateral channel (and 89% of the multilateral aid was delivered by the Global Fund).

C. What next?

13. There is no ideal model or “one-size-fits-all” for determining aid allocation decisions at the national level. The objective in highlighting these donor practices is to explore whether possible inconsistencies at the overall systemic level, arising for example from the growing need for visibility and (apparent) control, require joint action across multilaterals and stakeholders in and beyond the DAC. While the overall share of multilateral aid is not increasing, more and more pressure is being placed on the multilateral system to deliver in countries and regions where bilateral donors are exiting or where they are less able to intervene (fragile states in particular). This will force difficult discussions on how far the organisations, funds and the architecture as a whole – created by members, shareholders and contributors – are fit to purpose to assume an increasingly complex and broad agenda. The eight best practice lessons identified below, which are limited to the “why” and “how” of multilateral aid allocation, are discussed and substantiated in the main report. A further set of lessons could emerge from DAC discussions.

Eight Emerging Best Practice Lessons on “Good Multilateral Donorship”

(Paragraph numbers refer to the main text, not the Executive Summary).

1. **DO** articulate, publicise and regularly revisit your specific national case for multilateral contributions. (*Paragraph 4*)
2. **DO** explicitly review the division of labour between your multilateral and bilateral programmes. (*Paragraph 5*)
3. If fixed shares guide spending decisions, **DO** ensure they have broad coverage and are evidence-based. (*Paragraph 8*)
4. **DO** make maximum use of joint assessments, independent evaluation findings and third-party analyses. (*Paragraph 11*)
5. **DO** publicise the indicators and ratings influencing your future multilateral allocations. (*Box 1.2*)
6. **DO** assess multilateral performance against collective international, as well as national, priorities. (*Boxes 1.2, 2.2, and 2.3*)
7. **DO** periodically scrutinise allocations to all parts of the multilateral spectrum, even if semi-automatic. (*Paragraph 15*)
8. **DO** have a dedicated body periodically review all public spending through multilaterals. (*Paragraphs 19 & 20*)

CHAPTER 1: HOW DO MEMBER COUNTRIES DECIDE ON MULTILATERAL AID ALLOCATIONS?

1. This chapter looks at the different ways in which aid providers allocate funds between bilateral and multilateral aid, and then among multilateral agencies. It presents an overview of the results from the multilateral aid allocation survey, including by providing two DAC member case studies. It also points towards the different modalities adopted by members in the health sector.

2. The discussion of last year's *2010 DAC Report on Multilateral Aid* in the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) highlighted the need to look in more detail at the decision-making processes of different members. To this end, at the end of 2010, the DAC secretariat collected information on how members decide their multilateral aid allocations. The survey asked respondents if and where the bilateral to multilateral share of aid was discussed within government, whether there were limits on the share or amount of aid to all or some multilateral organisations, how decisions are made across government and what evidence governments relied on to make allocation decisions.

1.1 Why multilateralism?

3. In the current environment of budget constraints, proving that development assistance provides value for money is more important than ever. Governments face increasing pressure from legislative bodies and civil society to limit or scrutinize multilateral aid, which often appears too far removed from their financial oversight, and in reality often escapes their control as key decisions on what, where and how it is actually delivered are taken at the supranational level. On the other hand, there is a trade-off between such accountability and control concerns versus efficiency gains to be achieved from pooling resources across donors. Pooling resources facilitates burden-sharing, and leverages experience, sector and country expertise and geographic reach, as well as other assets which are arguably better deployed through a collective effort.

4. There is some evidence that providing *multilateral* development assistance limits the influence of domestic special interests that may otherwise seek to link this assistance to more political or commercial motivations.³ For example, a recent public opinion poll in EU member states⁴ found that respondents in 26 of 27 EU member states considered large international organisations to be better positioned than their own bilateral programmes to support developing countries. A recent paper, "The Choice for Multilateralism,"⁵ concludes that the principal-agent model best reflects the decisions involved in the choice for multilateralism. In this model, an individual donor (principal) and multilateral agency (agent) are pulled between the loss of control over funds and the benefits of burden sharing. How well the preferences of the agent align with those of the principal will determine the degree to which loss of control is a preoccupation for that donor. As seen in the example of the Russian Federation in the next chapter, donors are pragmatic about the use of multilaterals when interests align. The fact that there is

³ See Keohane, Macedo and Moravcsik (2009). Another theory discussed in Lake (2009) suggests that a hegemon chooses multilateralism as a form of self constraint.

⁴ Eurobarometer (Special) 352 (September 2010).

⁵ Milner & Tingley (2010)

little or no structured opportunity to “make the case” for multilateral aid as such in most DAC domestic settings inevitably means that citizens are only made aware in a relatively anecdotal way of the rationale for choosing alternative channels. **Articulating and publicising the national case for multilateralism is important to show the general public, legislators and civil society what they are getting in exchange for less direct control.**

1.2 Allocations between bilateral and multilateral aid

5. Just under half (11/23) of member countries indicated that they explicitly discussed the balance between bilateral and multilateral aid allocations within their administrations at least every three to five years. Seven countries⁶ carry out at least annual cross-government discussions on their gross multilateral and bilateral aid allocations, often in the context of broader inter-ministerial co-ordination or of budget negotiations with the Ministry of Finance and/or others. The majority of DAC member countries (16) do not explicitly discuss the balance of bilateral versus multilateral aid volumes within government on an annual basis, but indicate that they allocate aid first and foremost on the basis of aid effectiveness principles, regardless of the channel used. A change of donor government may precipitate a re-assessment of aid allocations, although such exercises are usually centred on re-examining the case for contributions to specific countries and agencies rather than the overall shares of bilateral and multilateral aid and the marginal benefit of one channel over the other. **Explicitly reviewing and revisiting the division of labour between multilateral and bilateral aid allocations will inform the public debate.**

1.3 Limits on multilateral aid

6. Less than one-third of members have limits or restrictions imposed on the amount of ODA provided through multilateral means. Many of these limits are used as guides, not binding constraints. For example:

- **Portugal** expects to allocate 40% of its aid multilaterally, but guiding principles for allocating multilateral support according to specific priorities also exist and may aggregate to a higher or lower share than 40%.
- **Korea** plans to increase its share of multilateral ODA from the present 28% to 30% by 2015, and to maintain that share thereafter.
- **Spain** imposed an upper limit on the funding of non-financial multilateral institutions until 2009. Today its limit changes each year depending on the general annual budget and applies only to grants provided to multilateral institutions by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.⁷
- **New Zealand** decided on a 0% growth of allocations to international organisations this financial year.
- The **German** BMZ (development ministry) budget has a one-third multilateral cap, although it is not binding in a legal sense and excludes the ODA component of the EU budget contribution (which is not attributed to BMZ directly) from the multilateral base.
- In December 2008, the **Swiss** parliament approved a law establishing a ceiling of 40% for multilateral development assistance through the end of 2012. This cap does not apply to multilateral aid for humanitarian assistance, to aid for Eastern Europe, or to aid for economic and commercial measures (all of which fall under different legislation).

7. These kinds of institutional arrangements generally are pragmatic means to accommodate political pressure to target or limit part or all of the national resources flowing to multilaterals, or to

⁶ Finland, Germany, Korea, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal and Spain.

⁷ This amounted to EUR 650 million in 2010.

certain subsets of multilaterals. Some stakeholders see this policy as an obstacle to the funding of effective multilateral instruments.⁸ Limits or ceilings do not appear to be backed by any strong evidence on the relative effectiveness of bilateral and multilateral aid for which comparable information is still somewhat scarce although recent efforts by research institutes and think tanks, such as the Quality of ODA (QuODA) Assessment⁹ gives a clear advantage to multilaterals in terms of aligning to partners' national priorities, providing more predictable aid, and providing a high level of sector specialisation.

8. While an imposed cap or limit has the advantage of being clear, it may protect parts of the bilateral and/or multilateral budgets from arbitrage and efficient prioritising that would otherwise occur in the budget process when considering best value for money for the entire aid spend. Even non-binding caps, ceilings or quotas that are poorly understood or not enforced may generate disproportionate transaction costs for little practical benefit. Because there could also be distortions between those multilaterals included and those not included in a selected baseline, where thresholds are pragmatically invoked by governments and/or legislators, it is important to include as broad a spectrum of programmes as possible in the overall baseline. **In addition, where a cap or limit already exists, it is important to provide clear information to legislators and civil society as to its rationale, and to amend it as needed in light of new evidence.**

1.4 Burden-sharing principles

9. Burden-sharing principles can serve as a guide in deciding how much to allocate to individual agency replenishments. For example, the United States publicly aims to contribute 20-25% of the annual budget requirements of UNHCR, the International Committee for the Red Cross and UNRWA. The United Kingdom strives to maintain its position as the second largest donor to IDA and France as the fifth largest. The United States has long held to a public stance that it would contribute half as much as the combined contribution of others (*e.g.* one-third of the total) to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria. In the context of this report, France indicated that consistent burden-sharing is in principle a good method to ensure predictable funding to multilaterals, but that the lower effective value of the Euro exchange rate compared to previous years and the participation of a growing number of donors made this benchmark less relevant in 2010 for that year's set of concessional fund replenishments.

1.5 What evidence informs aid allocations?

10. Box 1.1 below describes sources of evidence for making multilateral aid allocations cited by members, starting with the most common ones. The sixteen DAC members that also form part of the Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN) indicate that they use the MOPAN common approach to complement other assessments, evaluation and criteria used to determine multilateral aid allocations. Although an evaluation of how MOPAN results influence aid allocations has not taken place to-date, it is likely that donors with smaller budgets may rely more on MOPAN to help determine aid allocations to multilateral organizations than donors who either have a more global reach, or more resources and instruments at their disposal to conduct their own assessments.

11. In any case, it makes sense to make **maximum use of common and/or joint assessment databases and evaluations produced by institutions before considering additional analytical work** makes sense. The recent public release of the UK's *Multilateral Aid Review* and methodology (see Box 1.2) may in fact signal a move towards rendering subsequent reviews and methodologies public, allowing donors to apply different weights across multiple criteria.

⁸ OECD (2010b), p. 34.

⁹ Brookings and Center for Global Development (2010).

Box 1.1. Sources of evidence for multilateral aid allocations

As illustrated below, members depend on a variety of different sources of evidence to help inform their aid allocation decisions.

Factors or sources of evidence cited by at least 9 members:

- Relevance to donor priorities and interests
- Relevance to the aid architecture (importance of mandate, positioning, comparative advantage)
- Performance evaluations (MOPAN, COMPAS)
- Evidence, including perception, of the organisation's effectiveness

Factors or sources of evidence cited by at least 4 members:

- Donor influence and visibility within the organisation and ability to take part in governing bodies
- Review of multilateral aid portfolio
- Synergy with bilateral programme
- Political considerations
- Partnership, dialogue and consultation with multilateral organisations
- Feedback from multilaterals' own reporting
- Efficiency criteria

Factors or sources of evidence cited by at least one member:

- Historic contributions to multilaterals
- Paris Declaration Survey results
- Ability to address MDGs or global public goods
- Credibility and likely effectiveness of institutional reform
- Success of annual humanitarian appeals of the organisations.
- Partner country feedback
- Civil society feedback


Box 1.2: The United Kingdom's Multilateral Aid Review (MAR), 2010-2011

The United Kingdom's Department for International Development (DFID) published its "Multilateral Aid Review: ensuring maximum value for money for UK aid through multilateral organisations" on 1st March 2011, after a comprehensive and resource-intensive assessment exercise between July 2010 and February 2011. The multilateral aid review and the methodology are publicly available.

Conclusions. The review covered 43 multilateral organisations, of which 10 have a mainly humanitarian aid focus. It assessed organisations against a series of components under two broad performance dimensions, namely: (1) multilaterals' contribution to UK development and humanitarian objectives, as well as key cross-cutting issues of gender and development, conflict and fragility, and climate change and environment; and (2) organisational strengths and weaknesses. Value for money for UK aid was assessed on the basis of performance across both indices.

The headline conclusion was that from the perspective of UK taxpayers, of the 43 agencies, 9 were considered to provide very good value for money, 16 good, 9 adequate and 9 poor value-for-money, as shown in the figure below.

Figure 1: Value for money of the multilateral organisations for UK aid



Source: 2011 UK Multilateral Aid Review.

Broadly speaking, these rankings place most development banks, humanitarian organisations and global funds in the good-to-very-good zone (Northeast quadrant) and most specialised UN agencies in the adequate-to-poor range (Southwest quadrant), with a few exceptions. The EU was split by funding window, with a much higher score for the European Development Fund (EDF), which has an intrinsic focus on the poorest countries, than for EC-Budget programmes.

The assessments are used as a guide for ministerial decisions on allocations, but these also depend on wider UK objectives, the likelihood of reform by the organisations themselves, the outcome of replenishment negotiations and the availability of funding from other sources. However, it is clearly stated that the lowest ratings point toward ending core funding by DFID or placement in a "special measures" category to demand urgent improvements in performance, with close monitoring of

progress. In contrast, the highest ratings argue for significant scaling up of funding, although still with pressure for continuing improvements in performance. Since the poorest value for money organisations typically receive much smaller core contributions than the best, realignment on the same scale would not necessarily be easy for many members and shareholders who do not benefit from such financial headroom.


The Multilateral Aid Review (MAR) confirmed that the multilateral system is a critical complement to what the UK government can do alone. It found many strengths across the system. Multilateral organisations mobilise large-scale funding, bring specialist expertise and play pivotal leadership roles with other donors. The Review also highlighted a number of weaknesses. It showed that most multilaterals need to do more to demonstrate their specific contribution to development and humanitarian results. Most also need to cut unnecessary administrative costs, deliver efficiency savings and place a greater emphasis on securing value for money in their programming choices. There is scope to improve transparency and accountability and to focus more on delivering for girls and women. Some have serious human resource management problems, particularly in filling posts in difficult countries and many need to improve their performance generally in fragile contexts. Finally there is room for improvement in how the different parts of the international system work with each other. Reform of multilaterals in these areas is a high priority for the UK.

Methodology. The MAR drew on a wide variety of sources of evidence. These included submissions and other documentation from the multilateral organisations themselves, such as evaluations and reports to the governing bodies on policies and performance, and submissions from UK civil society. It also made use of quantitative data from other sources, some of which were coincidentally published just before the MAR, like the Quality of ODA (QuODA) index, Knack and Rogers, MOPAN assessments, the Aid Transparency Assessment 2010 as well as the HIPC Capacity Building project and the Paris Declaration Monitoring survey. These were complemented by a new component related to poverty-efficient aid allocations, the “Focus on Poor Countries” – combining need, country performance, vulnerability and the human development indices. This initial evidence gathering exercise was followed by a series of field visits and discussions with partner country Ministers and officials, other donors, civil society organisations and other stakeholders. Organisations were then rated on a four-point scale in each of the components of the two main axes: contribution to UK development objectives and organisational strengths.

These ratings were then subjected to a series of internal challenges (including by other UK government departments) and external review by two independent experts. This scoring system, much like for example the World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA), provides a package of rigorously quality-assured, but nonetheless ultimately subjective judgments, backed by varying degrees of quantifiable evidence and proof of causality between observed behaviour and result. A final element in each assessment estimates the likelihood (very likely, likely, uncertain) of positive change in the organisation under review.

Possible lessons learned. There are some clearly **positive lessons** from the MAR for the future work on the multilateral system by DAC and non-DAC members. The **first** is the value of articulating clearly and publicly the principles and rationale, as deemed relevant to each donor country, underpinning taxpayer-funded support to multilaterals, in such a way that quite a wide variety of development agencies can then be contrasted against them. The **second** is to recognise explicitly that development and humanitarian objectives are not the only national interest at stake. So, for example, it may be perfectly possible for DFID to place a low value on contributions to an agency, yet for some other UK department to find it important for other reasons. The **third** is maximum transparency – to publish all the empirical evidence and scores, allowing others to repeat or update the exercise with different assumptions or data and reach alternative conclusions.

Figure 2: Assessing focus on poor countries for multilateral organisations that support development objectives



Source: 2011 UK Multilateral Aid Review.

At the same time some **concerns** have been aired since the MAR was published, and this not just on the part of those low-rated agencies who objected to some specifics of their assessment. The **first** concern is that using a purely bilateral “lens” in such assessments misses out on inputs in the collective public interest of all states even if some of their views may have been informally canvassed in this case. The MAR tried to capture these global public goods by tracing them through to impact in poor countries (so, for example, it sees the WHO’s normative role as critically important, because these norms are clearly translated into changes in health practices on the ground), but it is not clear that the country-level data was always rich enough to fully support this approach. The **second**, and related, concern is that it would be unsustainable and inefficient for multiple bilaterals to launch similar reviews, even at a smaller scale and benefiting from some of the advances in methodology and data-gathering of the MAR. **Finally**, observers have remarked that the net effect of the MAR favours organisations that have a specific operational mandate at country-level over more “horizontal” multilaterals or more normative organisations whose strengths cannot be measured by examining country-level interventions.

Source: The UK’s Department for International Development (2011).

1.6 Decision-making models

12. The survey conducted at the end of 2010 asked DAC members to identify which ministries, departments or agencies are involved in deciding allocations to 29 different funds and organisations accounting for over 90% of all DAC multilateral allocations (see Annex B for survey questions). There was a 100% response rate to the survey, offering a comprehensive view of how the major shareholders and funders of the multilateral system make decisions. The survey results are complemented below by case studies on France and the United Kingdom. Results indicate some variation, from which two broad and contrasting models emerge.

Centralised model

13. Nine members adopt a “centralized model” whereby a single ministry, department or agency handles almost all aid allocation decisions to all 29 entities, ranging from international financial institutions to global thematic funds and UN agencies. Allocation decisions are concentrated in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as in the case of the Nordic members and New Zealand or the department or agency for development for the UK and Australia.

Decentralised model

14. Fourteen members have at least two separate ministries, departments or agencies responsible for deciding allocations to these 29 different entities, and can be grouped as adopting a more “decentralized model.” More commonly, these include the finance and foreign affairs branches of government (8 countries), but for the other six members this includes the development department/agency and up to three or more other ministries, departments or agencies that lead on specific allocations. Coordination among lead ministries/agencies ranges from formal inter-ministerial bodies that meet regularly to ad-hoc consultations between civil servants working on similar themes. Although EU institutions as a donor were not included in this component of the survey, their aid allocation model is closer to the decentralised model. Box 1.3 below highlights France’s overall structure and processes for aid allocation.

Box 1.3: France’s allocation and implementation of multilateral and bilateral aid

The French government has a comparatively decentralised approach in the implementation of its development assistance. Within the development assistance budget, the Ministry of Economy, Finance and Industry’s (MINEFI or “Bercy”) budget includes spending for initiatives that fall under the umbrella programme of “economic and financial aid for development,” while the Ministry of European and Foreign Affairs (MAEE or “Quai d’Orsay”) is responsible for the programme of “solidarity towards developing countries.” A smaller development assistance budget is also managed and implemented by the Ministry of Interior in charge of immigration (MIOMCT). There is no predetermined bilateral – multilateral allocation within ministry budgets and all three ministry budgets allocate both bilateral and multilateral aid.

Although the implementation of grants may be somewhat decentralised, the principal allocation decisions are centralised since the budget preparation process depends on ministry budget ceilings determined by the Prime minister. The inter-ministerial *Comité Interministériel de la Coopération Internationale et du Développement* (CICID) was created in 1998 and is chaired by the Prime minister. Its co-secretariat meets on a regular basis with representatives from the MAEE, MINEFI and MIOMCT, as well as the *Agence Française de Développement* (AFD), a financial institution and the main implementing agency for France’s bilateral ODA and other development finance to developing countries. This co-secretariat helps steer strategic decisions and monitors the implementation of CICID decisions and the evolution of France’s development assistance.

The decentralised nature of responsibility for implementation across two large ministries (for which development assistance represents only one of many budget lines) have led some critics to argue that this obstructs the effectiveness of aid since no one institution is responsible for overseeing the direction and strategy of French development assistance. Nonetheless, an internal ten-year strategy, or *Document cadre*, was approved in 2010, integrating views from civil society and other stakeholders. It is too early to tell what impact this strategy will have on the overall co-ordination of aid, namely for the administration of its multilateral aid.

Figure 1. France's Development Assistance Programmes

Ministry of Economy, Finance and Industry (MINEIE) / "Bercy"	Ministry of European and Foreign Affairs (MAEE) / "Quai d'Orsay"	Ministry of Interior (MIOMCT)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Multilateral contributions to international financial institutions: IDA, AfDF, AsDF, IFAD, GEF, trust funds • Concessional loans (implemented by AFD) and tied aid. • Global budget support and French Global Environment Fund • Debt relief <p>• Budget : EUR 1.2 billion</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Multilateral contributions to Global Fund to Fight Aids Tuberculosis and Malaria, UN agencies, Francophonie • European Development Fund (EDF) • Bilateral grants (implemented by AFD) <p>• Budget : 2,1 milliards EUR</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Contributions to AfDB for migration and development • Relocation of migrants to countries of origin • Other bilateral initiatives <p>• Budget: EUR 30 m</p>

Source: Budget figures are indicative based on 2010 proposed budget as communicated by the French government.

The illustration above underscores the fungibility of competing components within different ministry budgets (for which the envelopes are determined by the Prime minister according to Government priorities). For example, bilateral grants, the large core contributions to the Global Fund and EDF and contributions to most UN agencies all compete for funds from within the Quai d'Orsay's budget programme, but are only indirectly competing with the concessional windows of the development banks managed by Bercy. At the same time, there is no direct fungibility between bilateral loans and grants. In effect, even though these are in large part implemented by the same agency (AFD), they are disbursed by two different ministries (Bercy and Quai d'Orsay, respectively).

In many ways, France displays a high multilateral profile: it is among the top five donors to the Global Fund, European Development Fund and IDA, and a leader in innovative and multilateral financial mechanisms such as the international tax on airline tickets for the financing of UNITAID and IFFIm.

1.7 Allocations to specific multilateral entities

15. Decision points for allocating multilateral aid are composed of a variety of assessed (as a condition of membership) and discretionary choices. As conceded at the beginning of the survey, a few contributions to multilateral organisations are imposed (assessed) as a condition of membership (*e.g.* IMF and multilateral development banks' paid-in contributions; the EC Budget, the UN Secretariat) and others are locked in for a number of years based on the outcome of a negotiated replenishment (*e.g.* EDF, IDA, GEF, and the Global Fund). Others operate on both an assessed and a voluntary basis (*e.g.* WHO, UNEP). Finally, there are those multilateral organisations to which contributions are entirely voluntary (*e.g.* UN Funds and Programmes). While there is often degree of momentum from past arrangements, conventions, and implied obligations, there is nonetheless room for discretion in all or at least most cases. With this in mind, **it may make sense to periodically scrutinise allocations to all parts of the multilateral spectrum, even if semi-automatic.**

Multilateral development banks

16. Paid-in capital subscriptions and recapitalizations of the non-concessional windows of the multilateral development banks – the Asian Development Bank, African Development Bank, Inter-American Development Bank and the World Bank’s IBRD – are made by finance ministries (or equivalents) for around half of DAC members. Australia, Belgium, and Canada also involve their development ministries or agencies in these decisions. Authority in Germany, Greece and the United Kingdom lies exclusively with the development agency or ministry for these institutions, whereas decisions in Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden concentrate their funding decisions largely within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In the context of the recent global financial and economic crisis, donors agreed to increase capital to the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the African Development Bank, and the IBRD.

17. The concessional windows of the development banks and funds – African and Asian Development Funds, IDB Fund for Special Operations, PRGF and HIPC trust funds and the World Bank’s IDA – operate on the basis of voluntary contributions even if elements of burden-sharing may be predetermined. Decision leads in donor governments mirror those for the non-concessional windows above.

The special case of funding to the EU

18. For the 15 DAC EU members, responsibility for negotiating the EU’s European Development Fund (EDF) replenishment every five years is more or less evenly spread across three different ministries, with one-third leading from each of the development, finance and foreign ministries or departments. In recent years 65% or USD 8 billion¹⁰ of total DAC EU members’ ODA to EU institutions was allocated directly from members’ contributions to the overall EU budget. The European Parliament and the Council (Member States) have responsibility and oversight over these resources. Members’ contributions to the EU budget come from a number of sources, including customs duties, value-added tax, and gross national income-based resources. The share of the EU budget attributed as ODA is considered a non-discretionary expense that does not figure in ministry budgeting at the individual member state level, with the exception of the United Kingdom, which reintegrates the ODA-eligible budget contribution back into its Department for International Development (DFID) budget for oversight purposes.

Other multilateral and multi-bi ODA allocations

19. Lead agencies, ministries or departments that decide allocations to the remaining multilateral agencies or funds surveyed are presented in more detail in Table 1.1 below. Foreign ministries of DAC members are responsible for the budget lines for the majority of multilateral organisations and funds in the table. Within governments, however, there are many examples of dispersed decision-making, making coordination more complicated. Interestingly, when it comes to providing earmarked funding channelled through multilaterals, the responsibility for allocation may lie with an entirely different ministry than the one responsible for core (un-earmarked) contributions to that organization or fund.

20. In the case of Sweden, for example, all multi-bi or non-core multilateral aid is determined by the development agency (SIDA), while for other members this type of earmarked funding is the responsibility of line ministries dealing with similar sectoral investments. This diffused responsibility for funding to and through the same or even similar organisations or agencies can lead to a situation where there is no overview of the different types of allocations made across government to these same entities. **For this**

¹⁰ This is a three-year average (2007-9) according to DAC aggregate statistics, 2010.

reason, it is important for a cross-government discussion to take place in a single manageable body at sub-ministerial level to regularly review all contributions to multilateral agencies.

Table 1.1. Lead agencies, ministries or departments for allocation decisions made by 22 DAC member countries

	Foreign	Development	Finance	Health	Agriculture	Environment	Economy	Education	Combination of different Ministries / Departments
UNDP	14	9	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
UNDPKO	18	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	2
GAVI	9	7	1	1	-	-	-	-	-
Global Fund	12	8	-	2	-	-	-	-	-
UNICEF	16	7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
WHO	6	2	-	9	-	-	-	-	6
FAO	7	3	-	-	9	-	-	-	4
Global Environment Facility (GEF)	6	6	7	-	-	2	-	-	2
Clean Technology Fund	3	3	4	-	-	3	-	-	1
Climate Investment Funds	4	4	4	-	-	2	1	-	1
UN-REDD	5	3	-	-	-	2	-	-	1
Education for All – Fast Track Initiative	7	10	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
UNESCO	14	2	-	-	-	-	-	4	3
Global Agriculture and Food Security Program	3	7	2	-	-	-	-	-	-
UNHCR	16	7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
WFP	12	7	-	-	2	-	-	-	2
TOTAL	157	91	22	12	11	9	1	4	24

Source: Secretariat survey on multilateral aid allocations, December 2010.

1.8 How donors allocate aid by sector: A closer look at health

21. Development assistance for health is characterized by a large number of different types of funders, channels and implementers. The aid allocation survey inquired as to the lead government ministry or agency responsible for ODA allocations to the main multilateral organisations and funds for health (GAVI, Global Fund, UNFPA, UNICEF, WHO), but it is important to also monitor donors' different aid modalities. For this reason, aid modalities for six broad health subcategories¹¹ were examined over a three-year period from 2007 to 2009. The “multilateral aid” modality in the table below was calculated by imputing the different sector codes of each multilateral organisation's outflows back to donors' core contributions to these multilateral agencies.

22. Table 1.2 below provides an overview of the modalities adopted for the delivery of aid in health systems and disease-specific interventions for DAC members. According to OECD-DAC data, the NGO category is not the preferred modality of any DAC donors for any health subcategory. Nonetheless, a recent study on development assistance for health by the Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation¹² indicated that this is the most important channel for private funding, so it is certainly not to be ignored when looking at the more global health financing picture.

23. The volume of bilateral aid for HIV/AIDS and sexually-transmitted diseases was twice the volume delivered multilaterally. However, taking out the contributions of just one donor, the United States, which has a very large bilateral HIV/AIDS programme¹³ makes the multilateral channel more important than the direct bilateral channel (and 89% of the multilateral aid was delivered by the Global Fund). Multilateral aid was also the most important modality in the delivery of health assistance for

¹¹ CRS purpose codes were grouped for the purpose of this exercise as explained in Annex C.

¹² IHME (2010).

¹³ U.S. President's Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR).

malaria (Global Fund and World Bank) and tuberculosis (Global Fund). Similarly, over 60% of the funding for infectious disease control took place via the multilateral system, either through earmarked funds channelled through UN agencies or through core funding to the EU and GAVI.

24. ODA towards health systems, or a country's system of delivering services for the prevention and treatment of disease and for the promotion of physical well-being, is primarily bilateral. Together, nearly as much aid was delivered by multilateral organisations (41%, both multilateral ODA and bilateral ODA channelled through multilaterals) as was delivered bilaterally (44%) for the six health sub-categories identified in the report. Thirteen DAC member countries relied more on multilateral organisations and funds to deliver development assistance for health: Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland. The remaining ten DAC member countries (Australia, Belgium, Canada, Greece, Ireland, Korea, Luxembourg, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States) provided more of their health ODA through bilateral channels.

25. These findings provide only a brief overview of official development assistance for health, but could be the basis of a more nuanced understanding of DAC members' allocation decisions and the basis for further work in the months to come.

Table 1.2. Modalities adopted by DAC member countries by health subsector.

	3-yr average by modality (USD constant 2009 millions)	3-yr average by modality (%)	Number of donors for which modality is most important
Health systems	4,984		
Bilateral	2,217	44%	15
Bilateral - channeled through Multilaterals	528	11%	0
NGOs	724	15%	0
Multilateral aid	1,515	30%	7
Infectious disease control	1,085		
Bilateral	328	30%	5
Bilateral - channeled through Multilaterals	413	38%	5
NGOs	102	9%	2
Multilateral aid	241	22%	10
Malaria control	945		
Bilateral	92	10%	0
Bilateral - channeled through Multilaterals	44	5%	0
NGOs	140	15%	0
Multilateral aid	669	71%	22
STD & HIV/AIDS	5,938		
Bilateral	3,220	54%	6
Bilateral - channeled through Multilaterals	125	2%	1
NGOs	1,025	17%	0
Multilateral aid	1,567	26%	16
TB control	457		
Bilateral	40	9%	0
Bilateral - channeled through Multilaterals	33	7%	0
NGOs	30	6%	1
Multilateral aid	354	77%	20
Nutrition	244		
Bilateral	65	27%	4
Bilateral - channeled through Multilaterals	66	27%	3
NGOs	47	19%	1
Multilateral aid	66	27%	14
Total Health	13,654		
Bilateral	5,962.3	44%	
Bilateral - channeled through Multilaterals	1,210.9	9%	
Bilateral - channeled through NGOs	1,725.8	13%	
Core funding to NGOs	341.9	3%	
Multilateral aid	4,412.9	32%	

Source: Creditor Reporting System, 2011.

1.9 Conclusion and best practice lessons

26. There is no ideal model or “one-size-fits-all” for determining aid allocation decisions at the national level. The different assessments and priorities assigned to specific multilaterals do not allow for absolute conclusions or purely scientific comparisons. The objective in bringing donor practices into relief is to explore whether the growing need for visibility and (apparent) control requires joint action across multilaterals and stakeholders in and beyond the DAC. It also suggests that governments may want to have a transparent strategy relative to their multilateral ODA, and at least an internal overview of which organisations are being funded in what way and for what reason so as to better communicate the advantages (and disadvantages) to enthusiastic (and wary) citizens.

27. While the overall share of multilateral aid is not increasing, more and more pressure is being placed on the multilateral system to deliver in countries and regions where bilateral donors are exiting or

where they are unable to intervene. This will force difficult discussions on how the organisations, funds and the architecture as a whole – created by members, shareholders and contributors – is fit to purpose to assume an increasingly complex and broad agenda. Even if the stakeholders and contributors to the multilateral system lie well beyond OECD membership, the Development Assistance Committee could discuss the design of the aid architecture and attempt to agree on best practice lessons that could be useful across its membership, capitalising on the momentum around the Fourth High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness later this year. Drawing on members’ responses to the survey and a review of member policies, some of these best practice lessons could include:

1. **DO** articulate, publicise and regularly revisit your specific national case for multilateral contributions.
(Paragraph 4)
2. **DO** explicitly review the division of labour between your multilateral and bilateral programmes.
(Paragraph 5)
3. If fixed shares guide spending decisions, **DO** ensure they have broad coverage and are evidence-based.
(Paragraph 8)
4. **DO** make maximum use of joint assessments, independent evaluation findings and third-party analyses.
(Paragraph 11)
5. **DO** publicise the indicators and ratings influencing your future multilateral allocations.
(Box 1.2)
6. **DO** assess multilateral performance against collective international, as well as national, priorities.
(Boxes 1.2, 2.2, and 2.3)
7. **DO** periodically scrutinise allocations to all parts of the multilateral spectrum, even if semi-automatic.
(Paragraph 15)
8. **DO** have a dedicated body periodically review all public spending through multilaterals.
(Paragraphs 19 & 20)

CHAPTER 2: WHAT ARE THE GENERAL TRENDS OF MULTILATERAL AID ?

28. This chapter updates the overall trends from the *2010 DAC Report on Multilateral Aid*. It confirms the continuing decrease in the share of multilateral ODA as a percentage of total ODA and its concentration in a few large clusters of organisations and provides an update on the total use of the multilateral system. In addition, it features the multilateral development co-operation efforts of two countries beyond the DAC's membership - Brazil and the Russian Federation.

Box 2.1. Multilateral ODA, outflows and non-core multilateral / multi-bi aid

As in last year's report, a distinction is made both in the text and in the statistical annex between (a) multilateral ODA, measured as the funding to multilateral organisations (*i.e.* inflows); and (b) outflows from those agencies to partner countries.

(a) *Multilateral ODA* comprises official concessional contributions to multilateral agencies. To be classified as multilateral, a contribution must be to a recipient institution that:

- conducts all or part of its activities in favour of development;
- is an international agency, institution, or organisation whose members are governments or a fund managed autonomously by such an agency.
- pools contributions so that they lose their identity and become an integral part of its financial assets.


Multilateral ODA includes both assessed and voluntary un-earmarked contributions. Today, members report contributions to over 200 multilateral agencies in DAC statistics.

(b) In addition, 20+ multilateral agencies report their *outflows* to partner countries to the DAC.

Finally, contributions to multilateral organisations that are earmarked at any level – to a specific country, region, sector or theme – are reported as part of donors' bilateral ODA and identified by channels of delivery. This type of aid is referred to as *non-core multilateral ODA* or *multi-bi ODA*.

Source: OECD DAC Statistical Reporting Directives, 2010.

29. Figure 2.1 below shows gross ODA provided by DAC member countries in the past two decades. Over that time, multilateral aid (the solid blue at the bottom) has maintained a steadily declining proportion of gross ODA excluding debt relief as shown by the top dotted line. This share has declined to 20% when contributions to EU institutions are excluded from multilateral ODA, represented by the lower dotted line.

Figure 2.1. Gross ODA provided by DAC member countries, 1990-2009

Source: OECD DAC aggregate statistics, 2011

30. Twenty-eight percent¹⁴ of total DAC gross ODA, or USD 36 billion, is multilateral. An additional 12% of total ODA is routed through multilateral organisations as earmarked funding. Together this represents USD 51 billion. Figures 2.2a and 2.2b show DAC members' shares of multilateral ODA and Figure A.1. in Annex A illustrates the volumes of members' multilateral ODA.

31. Figure 2.2b allows for a comparison of multilateral shares across all DAC members since it excludes members' contributions to EU institutions to which not all members contribute. For example, Korea, Italy and Sweden have the largest proportion of multilateral as a share of gross ODA, excluding contributions to EU institutions (29%, 28% and 26% respectively), whereas Portugal, the United States and Greece provide the smallest proportion (12%, 12% and 11% respectively).¹⁵ France's share is at the median at 20%, just above the DAC average of 18%. While these figures alone cannot lead to any conclusions on donor preferences, donors closer to the right side have relatively large bilateral programmes in place and/or provide very little non-EU multilateral development assistance. Countries on the left have relatively small bilateral programmes in place and/or provide a relatively large amount to non-EU multilateral agencies.

¹⁴ Excluding debt relief.

¹⁵ These shares also exclude debt relief.

Figure 2.2a. DAC multilateral ODA as % gross ODA, 2007-9 average
(Excluding debt relief)





Figure 2.2b. DAC multilateral ODA as % of gross ODA, excluding contributions to EU institutions, 2007-9 average
(Excluding debt relief)



Source: OECD DAC aggregate statistics, 2011.

2.1 What is different about multilateral assistance spending?

32. As donor countries continue to face severe budget constraints, they are concentrating even more on value for money. Multilateral organisations receive USD 51 billion in multilateral ODA and bilateral ODA from DAC members, much of which falls under a kaleidoscope of accountability arrangements that very few ordinary citizens, and not many experts, fully comprehend. Last year's report highlighted the persistent challenges of communicating to domestic audiences both the ultimate results multilaterals achieve and the visibility and influence of an individual donor's contribution.


33. The past year has witnessed a rising level of scrutiny of multilateral aid by bilateral contributors and their legislative bodies. The latter are sometimes hampered by their lack of first-hand contact with multilateral operations on the ground. While there is some evidence that governments think that multilateral aid allocations could be more effectively spent by their own development organisations, there is also evidence that the public perceives multilateral ODA as less politicised, a step removed from the influence of domestic special interests. At the same time, this independence, perceived or actual, makes multilateral aid less attractive to powerful interest groups.

34. Oversimplifying, the diverse reasons for allocating bilateral and multilateral aid can be reduced to the basic tension between, on the one hand, the desire for control over how resources are spent and proper apportionment of the credit or blame, and, on the other hand, the wider benefits of pooling resources, presence, and expertise. DAC donors' multilateral aid allocation decisions and the evidence they take into consideration are discussed in more detail in Chapter 1.

2.2 Total use of multilateral system reached a historic high

35. The "market share" of multilaterals – composed of both earmarked ODA channelled through multilateral organisations (also known as "non-core" or "multi-bi" ODA) and core multilateral ODA – increased to 40% in 2009, as compared to 37% in 2007. The aggregate volume of ODA channelled to and through multilaterals was USD 51 billion, also a historic high. The underlying reason for this recent surge is a large increase in the non-core funding to multilaterals that host Global Partnerships and Programmes (GPP) as well as country-specific and regional/sector specific trust funds. With few notable exceptions, core multilateral aid has slowly decreased in the past decade. Figure 2.3 shows core and non-core contributions to multilateral agency groups in 2009.

Figure 2.3. Total use of the multilateral system, gross disbursements in 2009
(Excluding EU Institutions as a donor)



Source: OECD DAC aggregate statistics and Creditor Reporting System, 2011.

Note: "UN Funds and Programmes" include those funds and programmes for which disaggregated data is available: UNDP, UNICEF, UNFPA, UNRWA, UNHCR, and WFP. "Other UN" includes all other UN agencies.

Multilateral ODA share continued to erode...


36. Multilateral ODA rose from USD 26.6 billion in 2000 to USD 36.2 billion in 2009 (at 2009 prices and exchange rates). This represents an average annual real growth rate of 3%, compared to 4% for total gross ODA (excluding debt relief). Core multilateral contributions as a share of total ODA has fallen to a low of 28% in 2009 from a peak of 33% in 2001.

37. As shown below in Figure 2.4, the gap between the two curves widens over the past 20 years. If contributions to EU institutions are excluded, the declining share of multilateral aid becomes more prominent.

38. EU institutions are unique because they play a dual role in the international aid architecture. They both receive development funds from EU member states and channel funds through other multilateral organisations (and are a DAC member). This report attempts to reflect both roles. Reporting EU institutions as a group of multilateral organisations receiving contributions is consistent with longstanding statistical practices and treatment in other DAC publications. Outflows from EU Institutions are included wherever the analysis focuses on multilateral disbursements. At the same time, since DAC members contribute to EU institutions, it would be misleading to capture outflows from EU


Institutions while at the same time counting it in DAC members' multilateral ODA, since this would be double-counting.

**Figure 2.4: Gross multilateral ODA provided by DAC member countries
as share of total ODA, 1990-2009**
(Excluding debt relief)



Source: OECD DAC aggregate statistics, 2011.

39. Funding to EU institutions increased by 11% from 2008 to 2009, slightly increasing what was otherwise a flat overall multilateral share of ODA. Funding to United Nations agencies increased slightly in 2009, back to 2005 real levels. Core contributions to the World Bank decreased slightly compared to 2008, while contributions to the Global Fund increased significantly. Other global funds separately identifiable in DAC statistics include the Global Environment Facility (GEF) and the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisation (GAVI). Contributions to these agencies are no longer growing faster than total ODA (noting that their funding base also reaches beyond DAC ODA). Figure 2.5 illustrates the funding of the major agencies and agency groups from 2005 to 2009 and Figure A.3 in Annex A shows trends in five-year tranches for the past two decades.

Figure 2.5: Aid provided by DAC countries to a selection of multilaterals: 2005-9

Source: OECD DAC aggregate statistics, 2011.

...but non-core multilateral aid rose.

40. Bilateral ODA earmarked for a specific purpose, sector, region or country and channelled through multilateral agencies (“non-core” or “multi-bi” ODA) increased from USD 13.4 billion in 2008 to 15.0 billion in 2009, and now represents 12% of total ODA. The *2010 DAC Report on Multilateral Aid* discussed non-core multilateral ODA in detail. Some of this increase was initially attributable to better reporting by members, but this effect is diminishing over time. In 2009, close to 70% of funding channelled through multilaterals and attributed to specific countries went to fragile states.

41. Earmarked funding to multilateral organisations or funds may allow some donors to track results more easily, while raising their contributions’ visibility to domestic constituencies. Several members have also decided to concentrate on fewer partner countries. This may encourage DAC members to use multilaterals as service providers for specific bilateral programmes, or to maintain a presence in a specific country or region, further raising the earmarked share of multilateral transactions. Some DAC member countries have started to refer to this phenomenon as the growing “multilateralisation” of bilateral aid. At the same time, multilateral organisations perceive this as a growing “bilateralisation” of multilateral aid¹⁶. Table 2.1 provides a summary from last year’s report of the advantages and disadvantages of non-core funding through multilaterals from the point of view of partner countries, bilateral donors and multilateral organisations.

¹⁶ Sagasti (2005).

Table 2.1. Advantages and disadvantages of non-core multilateral aid (multi-bi ODA)


From the perspective of:	Advantages	Disadvantages
Partner country	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Enhanced harmonisation among donors, especially where it replaces parallel bilateral initiatives. - Trust fund steering committee may offer more representative governance arrangements for partner countries than organisation's Board. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Blurred lines of accountability in disbursement - Trust fund steering committee may offer less representative governance arrangements for partner countries than organisation's Board
Multilateral organisation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Increases overall resource envelope of the organisation - If multi-donor, preferable to multiple parallel bilateral initiatives - For specific, critical and time-bound purposes, preferable to the creation of a new organisation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Hollows out governance, bypasses Board decisions - Increases transactions costs (including reporting) - May conflict with the organisation's core policies or strategy - "Bilateralisation" of multilateral ODA
Bilateral donor	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Ability to focus on specific sectors, regions, countries of interest or to complement bilateral programme - Can make contributions more visible - Can circumvent onerous Board decisions - "Pilot" for setting up stand-alone funds or organisations 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Core contributions from donors may subsidise non-core funds' administrative costs - "Multilateralisation" of bilateral ODA

Source: OECD (2010a).

42. It will be important to monitor the increase in aid provided on a regional basis rather than to specific countries both via bilateral and multilateral channels in the coming years as a possible consequence of efforts to concentrate on fewer partner countries. This is especially significant for the aid effectiveness debate in particular since aid allocated regionally is often less predictable at the country-level. Figure 2.6 illustrates the magnitude of the "total use" of the multilateral system and Figure A.9 in Annex A, shows that the non-core component of funding for all eight United Nations agencies, except UNRWA and UNFPA, exceeds the core component by a significant margin.¹⁷ Table 2.2 below gives some examples of the types of flows that are earmarked and channelled through the multilateral system. This includes a mix of trust funds, global programmes and joint programming.

¹⁷ United Nations (2011).

Figure 2.6. Gross ODA disbursements, 2009
(Excluding debt relief, contributions from EU Institutions)



2009 Total ODA (excluding debt relief) = 128 bn

Source: OECD DAC aggregate statistics and Creditor Reporting System, 2011.

Table 2.2. Examples of earmarked funding channelled through multilateral organisations¹⁸

Description	Multilateral channel
Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund	World Bank
Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF)	UNOCHA
Clean Technology Fund	World Bank
Congo Basin Forest Fund	African Development Bank
Consolidated appeal for Iraq and the region	UNHCR
DRC Humanitarian Pooled Fund	UNDP
Education For All - Fast Track Initiative	World Bank
Emergency Program in the Horn of Africa	World Food Programme (WFP)
Environment Transformation Fund	World Bank
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative	World Bank
Global Agriculture and Food Security Program	World Bank
Jakarta Multidonor Trust Fund	World Bank
Law and Order Trust Fund - Afghanistan	UNDP
Polio eradication	WHO
Spain-ECOWAS	World Bank
Tropical diseases research	WHO
UN-REDD	UNDP
Water and Sanitation Fund	Inter-American Development Bank
Water Financing Facility	Asian Development Bank
West Africa regional market development	World Bank

Source: Creditor Reporting System, 2011.

¹⁸ UN-OCHA's Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) will be added to the list of ODA-eligible multilateral organisations as per the decision at the June 2011 WP-STAT meeting, so un-earmarked contributions to this fund will be considered as multilateral ODA beginning in 2010.

2.3 Complementary effects of multilateral ODA

43. Core contributions to multilateral organisations are in turn disbursed to partner countries or regional organisations. These “multilateral outflows” can be compared to bilateral ODA to get a sense of the allocation patterns of bilateral and multilateral organisations at the country level. The *2010 DAC Report on Multilateral Aid* compared the volume of bilateral aid and multilateral outflows relative to income-levels, sectors, regions and fragility status of partner countries. In 2009, a higher proportion (40%) of multilateral assistance was delivered to LDCs compared to the share of bilateral aid directed to LDCs (see Figures A.5 in Annex A). Multilateral donors were more concentrated or considered “significant” donors in the countries where they were present. Similarly, the report underscored the role of multilateral organisations in responding to country demand for crisis-related finance in 2009, when multilateral outflows increased by 19% compared to the previous year.

44. According to the forthcoming OECD DAC Survey of Donors’ Forward Spending Plans, only a modest country programmable aid (CPA) annual increase of 2% is expected up to 2013. This increase is mostly driven by multilateral donors, which represent one-third of CPA, but account for two-thirds of aid increases. These aggregate trends mask the fact that almost two-thirds of countries in all regions are projected to receive lower aggregate levels of aid by 2013 (98 countries out of 152)¹⁹. In a majority of cases, these predicted decreases can be attributed to phase-out decisions by DAC member countries as part of their efforts to concentrate aid on fewer partner countries. Multilateral outflows, which tend to have a more even country distribution than bilateral aid, can help mitigate this problem, but only to a limited extent, unless their resource base increases much faster than now appears likely.

45. Looking at allocation priorities, the past trend is expected to continue. The amount of CPA provided by multilaterals to LDCs is expected to increase by 1.6% annually through 2013. In contrast, DAC donor countries’ CPA to LDCs is expected to decrease slightly.²⁰ This confirms last year’s finding that annual increments of bilateral ODA and multilateral outflows appear to be somewhat negatively correlated and operate in a countercyclical manner.

2.4 Concentration in top 5 clusters of multilaterals

46. Data from 2009 confirm that DAC members concentrate a large portion (81%) of their multilateral aid on five main clusters of multilaterals. They are the EDF + EU budget (37%), IDA (21%), UN Funds and Programmes (10%), the African and Asian Development Banks (5% + 3%), and the Global Fund (6%). This means that 18% of multilateral aid goes to the remaining 200+ multilateral organisations, many of which provide technical assistance or serve a norms-setting purpose. Tables A.2 and A.3 in Annex A give the percentages contributed by each DAC member to these main clusters, both including and excluding contributions to the EDF and EU budget.

47. Recent multilateral aid reviews reveal what donors already acknowledge today, that there is no single, rigorously scientific method to compare the effectiveness or efficiency of multilateral organisations. Donors each have their own priorities for allocating aid to multilateral organisations, which were explored in more detail in the previous chapter.

¹⁹ OECD (forthcoming, 2011).

²⁰ Ibid.

2.5 Non-DAC donor multilateral aid

48. Twenty countries beyond the DAC's membership reported their aid flows to the DAC Secretariat in 2009, while some larger players (Brazil, the Russian Federation, China, and India) did not. From 2007-9, the eleven non-DAC EU member states provided 66% of their total ODA to multilaterals (including to EU institutions), while the average multilateral share of non-DAC donor states that report, excluding Arab donors, is 31%. Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the UAE report primarily bilateral aid to the DAC, so the multilateral share in DAC statistics is not meaningful. Larger regional players such as Brazil and the Russian Federation provide substantial multilateral aid to regional organisations or funds. It is unlikely that China and India provide a high share of multilateral aid: even if they increasingly contribute to concessional funds like IDA, they already have strong and rapidly growing bilateral programmes. Recent replenishments of concessional and global funds have increasingly relied on contributions from non-DAC donors, so getting more accurate information on their contribution to multilaterals is becoming more pertinent and important. Boxes 2.2 and 2.3 below discuss how and for what purposes the Russian Federation and Brazil fund multilateral organisations.

Box 2.2. The Russian Federation's multilateral development co-operation

The Russian Federation's policy on multilateral funding accounting for 70% of Russia's ODA is pragmatic: where multilaterals are present and able to deliver on the ground, in particular in the CIS region, these channels are adopted. An important objective of the Russian Federation's more recent development co-operation is to mitigate the adverse impact of the financial and economic crisis on its close neighbours, thus nearly one-half of Russian development co-operation is directed to poor countries in neighbouring regions.

The Russian Federation recently published its development assistance figures in the context of the G8 Deauville Accountability Report. Of the USD 472 million in development co-operation provided in 2010, close to 40 percent was spent on food security and health investments. Much of this was provided to or through multilateral organisations, including a USD 22 million core contribution to the Global Fund and USD 62 million for food security through earmarked contributions to the WFP, World Bank and the International Civil Defence Organisation (ICDO). This included direct food security support to assist smallholder farmers and funding for research and innovation to improve food security in the Eurasian region.

In the health sector, the Russian Federation also contributes to the World Bank – WHO Global Malaria Program which aims to control and eliminate malaria in Africa and CIS countries and the Advance Market Commitment (AMC) to stimulate the development and manufacturing of affordable pneumococcal vaccines in developing countries. The Russian Federation increased its IDA-16 commitment by 60%, representing 0.66% – more than USD 180 million – of the total donor pledges to the World Bank's IDA-16 replenishment.

Sources: Russian Federation (2011), World Bank (2011) and discussion with Russian Ministry of Finance and the World Bank.

Box 2.3: Brazil's multilateral development co-operation

A recent study on Brazil's development co-operation (*Cooperação Brasileira para o Desenvolvimento Internacional: 2005-2009*) featured data on Brazil's multilateral development co-operation. Brazilian contributions to international organizations reached USD 248 million in 2009, up from USD 189 million in 2005 (at 2009 constant prices and exchange rates). This is a 31% increase over five years, or a slightly higher increase than the DAC over the same period.

Close to one-third (30%) of this co-operation to international organisations goes to Mercosur's structural fund for competition, social cohesion and institution-building (FOCEM, *Fundo de Convergência Estrutural e de Fortalecimento Institucional do Mercosul*) which provides funding to Mercosur members (Paraguay, Uruguay, Brazil and Argentina) based on their level of development. In addition, Brazil provides close to one-fifth of its multilateral co-operation to the Inter-American Development Bank's concessional window and 1% to the African Development Bank's concessional window. Regional development banks and contributions to the WHO, the Pan-American Health Organisation, UNDPKO, UNHCR and WFP round out the multilateral portfolio. Brazil's bilateral co-operation is largely based on knowledge transfer and long-term partnerships through technical co-operation.

Since Brazil is a recipient and a provider of development co-operation, its legal framework requires some adjustment to carry out procurement functions and service provision for other developing countries. For this reason, the government often chooses to channel its bilateral contributions through multilateral institutions, primarily the United Nations system. The Ministry of External Relations centralises all government decisions on multilateral allocations, some of which are made on the basis of line ministry recommendations. In turn, the Ministry of Planning disburses contributions to these agencies and funds. Brazil committed 0.38% – more than USD 100 million – of the total donor pledges to the World Bank's IDA-16 replenishment.

Sources: ODI (2010), Brazilian Cooperation Agency (2010) and World Bank (2011).

Box 2.4: The role of non-DAC donors in the IDA-16 replenishment

Non-DAC members pledged over 5% (USD 1.4 billion) of total donor pledges to the sixteenth replenishment of the World Bank's concessional window (IDA) finalised at the end of 2010 as shown in the table below. Seven new donors pledged to IDA16, compared to IDA15, and all 52 non-DAC donors together pledged USD 26.4 billion (SDR 17.6 billion), a 6% increase over the IDA15 replenishment.¹

Table 1. Pledges to the IDA16 Replenishment

	Share	SDR million	USD million
Cyprus	0.03%	4.49	6.75
Czech Republic	0.07%	12.15	18.25
Estonia	0.02%	2.85	4.28
Hungary	0.08%	13.48	20.25
Latvia	0.01%	2.25	3.38
Lithuania	0.01%	2.05	3.08
Poland	0.04%	6.74	10.13
Slovak Republic	0.01%	2.25	3.38
Slovenia	0.03%	5.97	8.97
EU non-DAC total	0.30%	52.23	78.47
Argentina	0.26%	45.00	67.60
Bahamas, The	0.01%	2.58	3.88
Barbados	0.00%	0.45	0.68
Brazil	0.38%	66.56	100.00
Chile	0.13%	22.96	34.49
China	0.61%	107.02	160.78
Egypt	0.01%	1.56	2.34
Iceland	0.04%	6.74	10.13
Iran, Islamic Republic of	0.07%	12.25	18.40
Israel	0.09%	16.46	24.73
Kazakhstan	0.01%	2.00	3.00
Kuwait	0.29%	51.78	77.79
Mexico	0.38%	66.14	99.36
Peru	0.06%	10.32	15.50
Philippines	0.04%	7.52	11.30
Russia	0.66%	115.50	173.52
Saudi Arabia	0.42%	73.58	110.54
Singapore	0.19%	32.62	49.01
South Africa	0.13%	23.14	34.76
Turkey	0.07%	13.07	19.64
Total non-DAC pledges	4.14%	729.48	1,095.92
Total (DAC + non-DAC) donor pledges	100.00%	17,600.00	26,441.01

Note: This is based on an exchange rate of 1.5023 SDR = 1 USD

Source: World Bank (2011).

In addition to donor pledges, donor compensation of SDR 3.5 billion – USD 5.3 billion – was previously agreed under the MDRI replenishment. Internal resources (repayments of IDA credits; investment income on IDA's liquidity assets; and net income transfers from IBRD and IFC) accounted for SDR 11.7 billion (USD 17.6 billion). For IDA 16, these reflows will increase dramatically (75% in SDR terms), representing a significant contribution by former and current IDA borrowers through accelerated credit repayments from lower middle income countries¹ that borrowed interest-free loans from IDA in the past. Moreover, borrowing terms will be hardened for blend and gap countries. These innovations will help IDA16 provide a total of SDR 32.8 billion (USD 49.3 billion) to finance projects in the world's poorest countries over the three-year period ending June 30, 2014. This represents a 20% increase (in SDR terms) over IDA15.

2.6 Main Findings

- Total use of the multilateral system (multilateral ODA + earmarked funding channeled through multilaterals) reached a historic high in 2009 at USD 51 billion.
(Paragraph 35)
- The share of core multilateral ODA maintained its downward trajectory for the past decade when contributions to EU institutions are excluded. Contributions to the Global Fund increased and funding to UN agencies came back modestly to 2005 levels. Funding to EU institutions increased by 11% from 2008 to 2009.
(Paragraphs 36, 37, 39)
- Bilateral ODA channeled through multilaterals and earmarked for a specific purpose, sector, region or country (also known as “non-core” or “multi-bi” aid) increased to USD 15 billion in 2009 from USD 13.4 billion in 2008, representing 12% of total ODA and still growing fast.
(Paragraph 40)
- As donors cut administrative budgets and decide to concentrate on fewer partner countries, there are incentives for such “bilateralisation” of multilateral contributions in order to maintain at least an indirect footprint in a specific country, region or thematic area. Some DAC members refer to this phenomenon as the growing “multilateralisation” of bilateral aid.
(Paragraph 41)
- Future spending surveys point to declining amounts of country-programmable aid to a majority of developing countries, and especially to the more vulnerable groups such as LDCs, in the next 3 years. Multilateral outflows, which have a more even country distribution by design, help mitigate this problem, but only to a limited extent.
(Paragraph 44)
- DAC members continue to provide over 80% of their multilateral ODA to just five organisations or clusters: IDA, EU, UN Funds and Programmes, Regional Development Banks (African and Asian), and the Global Fund.
(Paragraph 46)
- Non-DAC EU donors provide a large share of their aid to EU institutions, while larger regional players such as Brazil and the Russian Federation provide substantial multilateral aid to regional organizations or funds. China and India have a lower multilateral share (i.e. usually preferring bilateral channels). However China and other middle-income countries played a key funding role in the IDA16 replenishment, for example by early prepayment of concessional loans and hardening of terms for remaining access.
(Paragraph 48 and Boxes 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4)

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
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
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ANNEX A. STATISTICAL FIGURES AND TABLES


Figure A.1. Gross multilateral ODA of DAC countries (2007-9 average)



Source: OECD DAC aggregate statistics, 2011.

Figure A.2. Total use of the multilateral system (2007-9 average)

Source: OECD DAC aggregate statistics and Creditor Reporting System, 2011.

Figure A.3. Average aid provided by DAC countries to a selection of multilaterals over five-year periods

Source: OECD DAC aggregate statistics, 2011.

Table A.1. Non-DAC ODA 2007-9
(in 2009 USD million)

Non-DAC Donor	Total ODA	Multilateral ODA	Multilateral as share of gross ODA (%)
Cyprus*	39	17	44
Czech Republic	209	115	55
Estonia	19	15	79
Hungary	109	83	76
Latvia	20	17	87
Lithuania	44	28	65
Malta**	14	6	45
Poland	376	259	69
Romania**	138	107	78
Slovak Republic	78	49	62
Slovenia	64	39	61
EU 11 total	1,110	736	66
Chinese Taipei	454	19	4
Iceland	44	11	25
Israel***	124	17	14
Korea****	804	235	29
Liechtenstein	23	3	14
Thailand	95	8	8
Turkey	697	48	7
Non-DAC (excl. Kuwait, Saudi, UAE)	3,350	1,076	32
Kuwait	560	1	0
Saudi Arabia	3,325	85	3
United Arab Emirates	597	-	-

* Footnote by the European Union Member States of the OECD and the European Commission: The Republic of Cyprus is recognised by all members of the United Nations with the exception of Turkey. The information in this document relates to the area under the effective control of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus'

* Footnote by Turkey: The information in this document under the heading "Cyprus" relates to the southern part of the Island. There is no single authority representing both Turkish and Greek Cypriot people on the Island. Turkey recognises the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). Until a lasting and equitable solution is found within the context of the United Nations, Turkey shall preserve its position concerning the "Cyprus" issue.'

** Malta started reporting to the DAC in 2009 and Romania started reporting to the DAC in 2008. Therefore, the data above includes just one or two years of reporting.

*** The statistical data for Israel are supplied by and under the responsibility of the relevant Israeli authorities. The use of such data by the OECD is without prejudice to the status of the Golan Heights, East Jerusalem and Israeli settlements in the West Bank under the terms of international law.

**** Korea acceded to the DAC on 25 November 2009.

Note: The Republic of Korea is included here since it also includes aid flows prior to 2009.


Source: OECD DAC aggregate statistics, 2011.

Figure A.4. Distribution of aid by sector

2009 bilateral ODA by sector

Gross disbursements, excluding debt relief
(In constant 2009 prices)


Total bilateral ODA = USD 91 billion



2009 multilateral outflows by sector

Gross disbursements, excluding debt relief
(In constant 2009 prices)

Total multilateral outflows = USD 37 billion




Source: OECD Creditor Reporting System, 2010.

Figure A.5. Distribution of aid by partner country income

2009 bilateral ODA by sector

Gross disbursements, excluding debt relief
(In constant 2009 prices)


Total bilateral ODA = USD 91 billion



2009 multilateral outflows by sector

Gross disbursements, excluding debt relief
(In constant 2009 prices)

Total multilateral outflows = USD 37 billion




Source: OECD Creditor Reporting System, 2010.

Figure A.6 Distribution of aid by region**2009 bilateral ODA by sector**


Gross disbursements, excluding debt relief
(In constant 2009 prices)

Total bilateral ODA = USD 91 billion

**2009 multilateral outflows by sector**

Gross disbursements, excluding debt relief
(In constant 2009 prices)

Total multilateral outflows = USD 37 billion




Source: OECD Creditor Reporting System, 2010.

Figure A.7. Distribution of aid by conflict / fragility status

2009 bilateral ODA by sector

Gross disbursements, excluding debt relief
(In constant 2009 prices)


Total bilateral ODA = USD 63 billion



2009 multilateral outflows by sector

Gross disbursements, excluding debt relief
(In constant 2009 prices)

Total multilateral outflows = USD 31 billion



Note: The allocations on the basis of conflict and fragility are based only on aid allocated by country.

Source: OECD Creditor Reporting System, 2010.

Table A.2: DAC gross multilateral ODA disbursements over the five year period 2005-9
(In 2009 USD million)

	Total multilateral ODA 2005-2009	Share of EU budget + EDF 2005-2009	Donor's share of global multilateral ODA	IDA	EU budget + EDF	UN Funds and Programmes*	Global Fund	AfDB	AsDB	Other Multilaterals	% allocated to largest six multilateral clusters
<i>Number of DAC donors</i>				23	15	23	22	18	22		
Non-EU members	45,562	-	28%	34%		13%	10%	6%	7%	29%	71%
Australia	1,790	-	1%	41%		8%	5%	0%	16%	31%	69%
Canada	5,326	-	3%	28%		12%	11%	11%	6%	31%	69%
Japan	16,553	-	10%	38%		10%	5%	5%	13%	29%	71%
New Zealand	322	-	0%	15%		28%	0%	0%	9%	47%	53%
Norway	4,331	-	3%	15%		42%	5%	9%	1%	28%	72%
Switzerland	2,465	-	2%	41%		21%	1%	11%	3%	23%	77%
United States	14,778	-	9%	34%		8%	20%	5%	4%	30%	70%
EU members	116,440	59,874	71%	16%	51%	8%	5%	4%	1%	14%	86%
Austria	2,489	1,423	2%	23%	57%	3%	0%	8%	2%	8%	92%
Belgium	4,277	2,396	3%	21%	56%	5%	2%	4%	1%	11%	89%
Denmark	4,641	1,323	3%	11%	29%	26%	3%	4%	1%	27%	73%
Finland	2,187	954	1%	11%	44%	21%	0%	6%	1%	17%	83%
France	21,800	12,078	13%	12%	55%	2%	8%	4%	1%	17%	83%
Germany	21,346	13,271	13%	19%	62%	2%	4%	4%	1%	8%	92%
Greece	1,464	1,145	1%	10%	78%	1%	0%	0%	0%	11%	89%
Ireland	1,711	685	1%	15%	40%	21%	4%	0%	3%	17%	83%
Italy	13,712	8,253	8%	12%	60%	3%	6%	3%	1%	14%	86%
Luxembourg	601	160	0%	9%	27%	18%	2%	0%	7%	37%	63%
Netherlands	8,049	2,787	5%	10%	35%	24%	5%	3%	1%	21%	79%
Portugal	1,091	773	1%	8%	71%	2%	1%	6%	3%	9%	91%
Spain	9,473	5,183	6%	14%	55%	6%	4%	4%	2%	16%	84%
Sweden	6,612	1,381	4%	19%	21%	30%	5%	7%	1%	17%	83%
United Kingdom	16,987	8,061	10%	24%	47%	7%	4%	4%	1%	12%	88%
DAC Total	162,002	59,874	99%	21%	37%	10%	6%	5%	3%	19%	81%
Korea	980	-	1%	31%		4%	0%	6%	16%	42%	58%


Source: OECD DAC aggregate statistics, 2011.

Table A.3: DAC gross multilateral ODA disbursements over the five year period 2005-9, excluding contributions to the EDF and EU budget
(In 2009 USD million)

	Total multilateral ODA, excluding to EU budget + EDF 2005-2009	Donor's share of global multilateral ODA, excluding to EU budget + EDF	UN Funds and Programmes*	Global Fund	AfDB	AsDB	Average % allocated to Top agencies excluding EC	Other Multilaterals
<i>Number of DAC donors</i>			23	22	18	22		
Non-EU members	45,562	44%	13%	10%	6%	7%	14%	29%
Australia	1,790	2%	8%	5%	0%	16%	14%	31%
Canada	5,326	5%	12%	11%	11%	6%	14%	31%
Japan	16,553	16%	10%	5%	5%	13%	14%	29%
New Zealand	322	0%	28%	0%	0%	9%	11%	47%
Norway	4,331	4%	42%	5%	9%	1%	14%	28%
Switzerland	2,465	2%	21%	1%	11%	3%	15%	23%
United States	14,778	14%	8%	20%	5%	4%	14%	30%
EU members excl. EC	56,566	55%	17%	10%	9%	3%	14%	30%
Austria	1,066	1%	8%	0%	18%	4%	16%	18%
Belgium	1,880	2%	11%	4%	9%	3%	15%	26%
Denmark	3,318	3%	37%	4%	5%	1%	13%	37%
Finland	1,233	1%	37%	0%	11%	2%	14%	29%
France	9,722	9%	4%	18%	10%	2%	12%	38%
Germany	8,075	8%	5%	11%	10%	3%	16%	21%
Greece	319	0%	4%	0%	0%	0%	10%	51%
Ireland	1,026	1%	35%	7%	0%	5%	14%	28%
Italy	5,459	5%	8%	15%	8%	2%	13%	36%
Luxembourg	441	0%	25%	3%	0%	9%	10%	51%
Netherlands	5,262	5%	36%	8%	5%	2%	13%	33%
Portugal	319	0%	7%	4%	22%	10%	14%	29%
Spain	4,289	4%	14%	8%	10%	4%	13%	34%
Sweden	5,231	5%	37%	7%	9%	1%	16%	21%
United Kingdom	8,926	9%	13%	8%	9%	3%	15%	23%
DAC Total (excl. EC)	102,128	99%	15%	10%	7%	5%	14%	29%
Korea	980	1%	4%	0%	6%	16%	12%	42%

Source: OECD DAC aggregate statistics, 2011.

Figure A.8. Multilateral ODA allocations (1990-2009) grouped by five-year averages



* Only six UN Funds and Programmes are separately identifiable in DAC members' reporting: UNDP, UNICEF, UNRWA, WFP, UNHCR and UNFPA. Other UN Funds and Programmes are aggregated into the "Other UN" category.

** The first contributions to GAVI and the Global Fund were in 2002, so the 2000-4 figure is the 3-year rather than 5-year average


Source: OECD DAC aggregate statistics, 2011.

Table A.4. DAC Gross multilateral ODA
Three-year annual average (2007-9) disbursements, in 2009 USD million

DAC country	EU Institutions	The World Bank Group	UN Funds and Programmes	Other UN	Regional Dev. Banks	The Global Fund	Other multilateral agencies	Multilateral ODA, total
Australia	-	160	35	49	54	16	65	378
Austria	295	131	17	25	50	-	17	536
Belgium	534	183	48	44	50	19	41	919
Canada	-	331	118	93	287	75	117	1,022
Denmark	262	150	230	99	55	31	113	939
Finland	202	49	91	40	43	-	34	458
France	2,539	577	95	163	227	416	713	4,730
Germany	2,733	1,095	93	218	244	228	163	4,773
Greece	251	29	2	12	15	-	11	320
Ireland	145	37	80	30	12	23	19	345
Italy	1,716	339	95	213	127	190	83	2,762
Japan	-	998	174	509	653	209	363	2,906
Luxembourg	37	20	27	35	6	3	7	136
Netherlands	592	239	392	173	86	93	92	1,666
New Zealand	-	11	21	15	6	-	18	71
Norway	-	131	331	138	89	56	107	853
Portugal	164	20	4	8	22	3	7	228
Spain	1,073	325	143	149	140	81	91	2,001
Sweden	307	311	394	149	128	77	56	1,423
Switzerland	-	213	107	49	64	7	73	511
United Kingdom	1,824	887	230	222	233	141	134	3,669
United States	-	1,066	233	509	257	690	336	3,092
Total DAC	12,671	7,222	2,953	2,904	2,774	2,359	2,648	33,531
Korea*	-	77	8	37	75	-	13	211
<i>Share of total multilateral ODA (%)</i>	38	22	9	9	8	7	8	100

* Korea made its first contribution to the Global Fund in 2009, so this amount is not a 3-year average.

Source: OECD DAC aggregate statistics, 2011.

Figure A.9. Core and non-core contributions, 2009 current USD millions

Source: United Nations (May 2011). “Analysis of funding for operational activities for development of the United Nations system for 2009.”

ANNEX B: QUESTIONNAIRE SENT TO DAC MEMBERS LATE 2010

Survey for DAC Members

One of the conclusions of the *2010 DAC Report on Multilateral Aid*²¹ was that the next report should present updated information on each Member's allocation and management of multilateral aid.

Purpose

The purpose of this survey is to better understand how members make aid allocation decisions first between bilateral and multilateral aid, and in the second instance among multilateral organisations. At the same time, it is important to understand the context of the decision-making process and the extent to which policy makers have leeway in making these decisions concerning overall development assistance. For this reason, we have designed a short survey. In addition, we hope that officials will be able to review and amend a few paragraphs on aid allocations collected by the DAC Secretariat in 2008 and in 2010 for the multilateral aid report (see attached paragraph/s).

Management of multilateral aid

A few contributions to multilateral organisations are imposed (assessed) as a condition of membership (*e.g.* IMF, IBRD, capitalisation of Regional Development Banks, the EC Budget, and the UN Secretariat). Others are locked-in for a number of years based on the outcome of a negotiated replenishment (*e.g.* EDF, IDA, GEF, and the Global Fund). Yet others operate on both an assessed and a voluntary basis (*e.g.* WHO, UNEP). Finally, some multilateral aid contributions are completely voluntary (*e.g.* UN Funds and Programmes), and donors re-assess contributions to these organisations on an annual basis.

Contact

Please feel free to contact Emily Bosch (emily.bosch@oecd.org, +33 1 45 24 79 67) or Andrew Rogerson (andrew.rogerson@oecd.org, +33 1 45 24 90 34) should you have any questions or concerns. If you would prefer to provide your answers over the phone, this can be easily arranged.

²¹ <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/23/17/45828572.pdf>

The survey consists of the following four questions. In addition, the country annexes from the *2008 DAC Report on Multilateral Aid*, and where applicable updates from the *2010 DAC Report on Multilateral Aid*, are attached to this survey as a complement to your answers below. Please take a few minutes to review and edit those sections as necessary.

1. (A) Is the balance between total bilateral and total multilateral aid allocations explicitly discussed within your government?

(B) If yes, in what forum / committee does this take place and how frequently?

2. Are there any limits or restrictions (legal or discretionary) on either (a) the overall share or amount of multilateral ODA, or (b) contributions towards specific multilaterals or categories of multilaterals (*e.g.* UN agencies)?

3. (A) What information or evidence does your government use to inform and determine multilateral aid allocations across multilateral agencies?

(B) If your country is a MOPAN member, how do (or will) results from the Common Approach impact your multilateral aid allocation processes?

4. Which ministry, department or agency has a final say on the level of core contributions to the multilateral organisations on the next page?

Contributions to Multilateral Organisations / Programmes

	Ministry / Department / Agency responsible for ODA allocation		Ministry / Department / Agency responsible for ODA allocation
African Development Bank (AfDB)		FAO	
African Development Fund (AfDF)		UNDP	
Asian Development Bank (AsDB)		UNESCO	
Asian Development Bank Special Funds		UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO)	
IBRD		United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA)	
International Development Association (IDA) - World Bank		UNHCR	
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)		UNICEF	
IDB Fund for Special Operations		World Food Programme (WFP)	
International Fund for Agriculture Development (IFAD)		World Health Organisation (WHO)	
IMF		Global Environment Facility (GEF)	
GAVI		Education for All - Fast Track Initiative	
Global Fund		Clean Technology Fund	
		Climate Investment Funds (World Bank)	
EC - Budget		The Global Agriculture and Food Security Program (GAFSP)	
European Development Fund (EDF)		UN Collaborative Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (UN-REDD)	

ANNEX C: HEALTH

Table C.1. Broad health groupings by different health purpose code.²²

Purposecode	Broad grouping	Description	Clarifications / Additional notes on coverage
12110	Health systems	Health policy and administrative management	Health sector policy, planning and programmes; aid to health ministries, public health administration; institution capacity building and advice; medical insurance programmes; unspecified health activities.
12181	Health systems	Medical education/training	Medical education and training for tertiary level services.
12182	Health systems	Medical research	General medical research (excluding basic health research).
12191	Health systems	Medical services	Laboratories, specialised clinics and hospitals (including equipment and supplies); ambulances; dental services; mental health care; medical rehabilitation; control of non-infectious diseases; drug and substance abuse control [excluding narcotics traffic control (16063)].
12220	Health systems	Basic health care	Basic and primary health care programmes; paramedical and nursing care programmes; supply of drugs, medicines and vaccines related to basic health care.
12230	Health systems	Basic health infrastructure	District-level hospitals, clinics and dispensaries and related medical equipment; excluding specialised hospitals and clinics (12191).
12240	Nutrition	Basic nutrition	Direct feeding programmes (maternal feeding, breastfeeding and weaning foods, child feeding, school feeding); determination of micro-nutrient deficiencies; provision of vitamin A, iodine, iron etc.; monitoring of nutritional status; nutrition and food hygiene education; household food security.
12250	Infectious disease control	Infectious disease control	Immunisation; prevention and control of infectious and parasite diseases, except malaria (12262), tuberculosis (12263), HIV/AIDS and other STDs (13040). It includes diarrheal diseases, vector-borne diseases (e.g. river blindness and guinea worm), viral diseases, mycosis, helminthiasis, zoonosis, diseases by other bacteria and viruses, pediculosis, etc.
12261	Health systems	Health education	Information, education and training of the population for improving health knowledge and practices; public health and awareness campaigns; promotion of improved personal hygiene practices, including use of sanitation facilities and handwashing with soap.
12262	Malaria control	Malaria control	Prevention and control of malaria.
12263	TB control	Tuberculosis control	Immunisation, prevention and control of tuberculosis.
12281	Health systems	Health personnel development	Training of health staff for basic health care services.
13010	Health systems	Population policy and administrative management	Population/development policies; census work, vital registration; migration data; demographic research/analysis; reproductive health research; unspecified population activities.
13020	Health systems	Reproductive health care	Promotion of reproductive health; prenatal and postnatal care including delivery; prevention and treatment of infertility; prevention and management of consequences of abortion; safe motherhood activities.
13040	STD & HIV/AIDS	STD control including HIV/AIDS	All activities related to sexually transmitted diseases and HIV/AIDS control e.g. information, education and communication; testing; prevention; treatment, care.
13081	Health systems	Personnel development for population and reproductive health	Education and training of health staff for population and reproductive health care services.

²² CRS purpose code 13030 (“family planning”) was not used in the exercise since only one multilateral agency identified and reported outflows in this category from 2006 to 2009.

ANNEX D: CORE AND NON-CORE MULTILATERAL

Table D.1 2009 DAC gross multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA disbursements
(In 2008 USD millions, excluding Debt relief)

	Total bilateral ODA	of which channelled through multilateral agencies (non-core)	Total multilateral ODA	Total use of the multilateral system	Core multilateral as share of total ODA (%)	Core and non-core as share of total ODA (%)	Core as share of total use of the multilateral system
Donor	(A)	(B)	(C)	(B+C)	(C/(A+C))	((B+C)/(A+C))	(C/(B+C))
Australia	2,309	542	450	992	16	36	45
Austria	461	75	635	709	58	65	89
Belgium	1,555	203	1,025	1,228	40	48	83
Canada	3,134	997	859	1,856	22	46	46
Denmark	1,906	106	904	1,011	32	36	89
Finland	791	222	499	721	39	56	69
France	6,690	49	5,691	5,740	46	46	99
Germany	8,208	417	4,983	5,400	38	41	92
Greece	297	14	310	324	51	53	96
Ireland	693	141	313	454	31	45	69
Italy	875	134	2,423	2,557	73	78	95
Japan	13,042	713	3,290	4,004	20	25	82
Korea	616	50	235	285	28	33	83
Luxembourg	266	48	149	196	36	47	76
Netherlands	4,913	957	1,628	2,585	25	40	63
New Zealand	226	23	83	106	27	34	79
Norway	3,152	977	918	1,895	23	47	48
Portugal	310	50	236	286	43	52	83
Spain	4,724	1,345	2,111	3,456	31	51	61
Sweden	2,993	838	1,539	2,378	34	52	65
Switzerland	1,598	246	559	806	26	37	69
United Kingdom	7,556	2,491	3,891	6,382	34	56	61
United States	25,736	4,345	3,667	8,012	12	27	46
Total	92,052	14,983	36,398	51,381	28	40	71
EU institutions	12,863	2,498	422.2	2,920	3	22	14

Methodology Note: Data on non-core multilateral aid can be found in the Creditor Reporting System database. Non-core multilateral aid is reported as bilateral aid, with a multilateral agency identified in the channel code. The following pages include members' core and non-core multilateral contributions. For one multilateral, UN-OCHA, core contributions are not separately identifiable in DAC statistics, so there is a "n/a" indicated.

Australia

Table D.2. 2009 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(Gross disbursements in 2009 USD million)

	Core	Non-core
World Bank Group	190	184
UN Funds and Programmes	53	215
<i>of which:</i>		
UNDP	16	33
WFP	-	95
UNICEF	15	55
UNFPA	5	9
UNHCR	12	19
UNRWA	4	4
Other UN	84	63
<i>of which:</i>		
FAO	4	9
IFAD	-	-
ILO	4	1
OHCHR	1	-
UNDPKO	-	-
UNECE	-	-
UNESCO	4	1
UN	6	-
UNOCHA	n/a	11
WHO	18	22
Regional Development Banks	45	35
Other multilaterals	100	45
Total	471	542

Figure D.1. 2009 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(Gross disbursements in 2009 USD million)




Table D.3. 2009 non-core multilateral ODA by region, sector and fragility status (In 2009 USD million)

	Australia	
Bilateral, unallocated / unspecified	128	24%
Country / region specific	414	76%
- of which regional allocations	2	
REGIONS		
South of Sahara	43	10%
North of Sahara	0	0%
Africa, regional multi-country	1	0%
Middle East	45	11%
Far East Asia	142	34%
South & Central Asia	111	27%
Asia, regional multi-country	0	0%
Oceania	70	17%
South America	0	0%
North & Central America	0	0%
America, regional multi-country	-	0%
Europe	0	0%
SECTORS		
Agriculture	8	1%
Developmental Food Aid	16	3%
Economic Infrastructure and Services	31	6%
Education	33	6%
Environment	25	5%
General Budget Support	16	3%
Government and Civil Society	60	11%
Health	51	9%
Humanitarian Aid	165	30%
Multi-sector	57	11%
Other Production Sectors (forestry, fishing, industry, mining, construction, trade policy, tourism)	25	5%
Other Social infrastructure	11	2%
Population Policies and Reproductive Health	14	3%
Water Supply and Sanitation	26	5%
Other (admin., promotion development awareness, refugees in donor countries)	3	0.5%
FRAGILE / CONFLICT*		
Fragile	177	43%
Other	235	57%

Austria

Table D.4. 2009 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(Gross disbursements in 2009 USD million)

	Core	Non-core
EU institutions	327	6
World Bank Group	159	26
UN Funds and Programmes	15	12
of which:		
UNDP	9	2
WFP	0	2
UNICEF	2	1
UNFPA	2	1
UNHCR	1	1
UNRWA	1	5
Other UN	21	9
of which:		
FAO	2	4
IFAD	-	-
ILO	2	-
OHCHR	0	0
UNDPKO	3	-
UNECE	0	-
UNESCO	1	0
UN	3	-
UNOCHA	n/a	-
WHO	3	0
Regional Development Banks	102	13
Other multilaterals	11	8
Total	635	75

Figure D.2. 2009 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(Gross disbursements in 2009 USD million)




Table D.5. 2009 non-core multilateral ODA by region, sector and fragility status (In 2009 USD million)

	Austria	
Bilateral, unallocated / unspecified	15	20%
Country / region specific	60	80%
- of which regional allocations	3	
REGIONS		
South of Sahara	12	20%
North of Sahara	0	0%
Africa, regional multi-country	1	1%
Middle East	7	11%
Far East Asia	-	0%
South & Central Asia	5	8%
Asia, regional multi-country	1	1%
Oceania	-	0%
South America	-	0%
North & Central America	4	8%
America, regional multi-country	2	3%
Europe	28	47%
SECTORS		
Agriculture	5	6%
Developmental Food Aid	4	5%
Economic Infrastructure and Services	25	33%
Education	0	0%
Environment	1	1%
General Budget Support	-	0%
Government and Civil Society	8	11%
Health	1	1%
Humanitarian Aid	9	12%
Multi-sector	11	14%
Other Production Sectors (forestry, fishing, industry, mining, construction, trade policy, tourism)	5	6%
Other Social infrastructure	1	2%
Population Policies and Reproductive Health	2	2%
Water Supply and Sanitation	4	5%
Other (admin., promotion development awareness, refugees in donor countries)	-	0.0%
FRAGILE / CONFLICT*		
Fragile	13	23%
Other	44	77%

Belgium

Table D.6. 2009 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(Gross disbursements in 2009 USD million)

	Core	Non-core
EU institutions	591	-
World Bank Group	156	38
UN Funds and Programmes	75	89
<i>of which:</i>		
UNDP	27	23
WFP	1	36
UNICEF	26	14
UNFPA	6	0
UNHCR	12	11
UNRWA	2	5
Other UN	82	52
<i>of which:</i>		
FAO	3	18
IFAD	9	7
ILO	3	5
OHCHR	1	-
UNDPKO	4	-
UNECE	-	-
UNESCO	2	5
UN	4	-
UNOCHA	n/a	2
WHO	11	5
Regional Development Banks	66	4
Other multilaterals	71	20
Total	1,040	203

Figure D.3. 2009 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(Gross disbursements in 2009 USD million)




Table D.7. 2009 non-core multilateral ODA by region, sector and fragility status (In 2009 USD million)

	Belgium	
Bilateral, unallocated / unspecified	19	9%
Country / region specific	184	91%
- of which regional allocations	7	
REGIONS		
South of Sahara	145	78%
North of Sahara	0	0%
Africa, regional multi-country	4	2%
Middle East	10	6%
Far East Asia	3	2%
South & Central Asia	16	9%
Asia, regional multi-country	3	2%
Oceania	-	0%
South America	1	0%
North & Central America	0	0%
America, regional multi-country	0	0%
Europe	2	1%
SECTORS		
Agriculture	16	8%
Developmental Food Aid	0	0%
Economic Infrastructure and Services	11	5%
Education	34	17%
Environment	3	1%
General Budget Support	-	0%
Government and Civil Society	20	10%
Health	3	2%
Humanitarian Aid	85	42%
Multi-sector	12	6%
Other Production Sectors (forestry, fishing, industry, mining, construction, trade policy, tourism)	2	1%
Other Social infrastructure	9	4%
Population Policies and Reproductive Health	8	4%
Water Supply and Sanitation	0	0%
Other (admin., promotion development awareness, refugees in donor countries)	0	0.0%
FRAGILE / CONFLICT*		
Fragile	131	74%
Other	46	26%

Canada

Table D.8. 2009 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(Gross disbursements in 2009 USD million)

	Core	Non-core
World Bank Group	40	238
UN Funds and Programmes	102	483
of which:		
UNDP	44	90
WFP	17	205
UNICEF	16	109
UNFPA	13	12
UNHCR	12	36
UNRWA	-	18
Other UN	108	117
of which:		
FAO	8	3
IFAD	-	0
ILO	2	2
OHCHR	4	-
UNDPKO	10	2
UNECE	-	-
UNESCO	3	0
UN	12	1
UNOCHA	n/a	7
WHO	20	63
Regional Development Banks	363	46
Other multilaterals	246	111
Total	859	997

Figure D.4. 2009 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(Gross disbursements in 2009 USD million)




Table D.9. 2009 non-core multilateral ODA by region, sector and fragility status (In 2009 USD million)

	Canada	
Bilateral, unallocated / unspecified	11	1%
Country / region specific	985	99%
- of which regional allocations	157	
REGIONS		
South of Sahara	397	40%
North of Sahara	7	1%
Africa, regional multi-country	52	5%
Middle East	47	5%
Far East Asia	33	3%
South & Central Asia	200	20%
Asia, regional multi-country	61	6%
Oceania	21	2%
South America	33	3%
North & Central America	81	8%
America, regional multi-country	44	4%
Europe	8	1%
SECTORS		
Agriculture	44	4%
Developmental Food Aid	17	2%
Economic Infrastructure and Services	59	6%
Education	62	6%
Environment	52	5%
General Budget Support	32	3%
Government and Civil Society	208	21%
Health	186	19%
Humanitarian Aid	232	23%
Multi-sector	12	1%
Other Production Sectors (forestry, fishing, industry, mining, construction, trade policy, tourism)	30	3%
Other Social infrastructure	12	1%
Population Policies and Reproductive Health	15	1%
Water Supply and Sanitation	35	4%
Other (admin., promotion development awareness, refugees in donor countries)	0	0.0%
FRAGILE / CONFLICT*		
Fragile	507	61%
Other	321	39%

Denmark

Table D.10. 2009 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(Gross disbursements in 2009 USD million)

	Core	Non-core
EU institutions	271	1
World Bank Group	126	16
UN Funds and Programmes	216	58
<i>of which:</i>		
UNDP	62	6
WFP	36	5
UNICEF	37	19
UNFPA	43	-
UNHCR	24	19
UNRWA	13	7
Other UN	66	30
<i>of which:</i>		
FAO	2	1
IFAD	4	-
ILO	0	6
OHCHR	2	-
UNDPKO	2	-
UNECE	-	-
UNESCO	1	0
UN	2	-
UNOCHA	n/a	14
WHO	3	-
Regional Development Banks	34	-
Other multilaterals	192	1
Total	904	106

Figure D.5. 2009 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(Gross disbursements in 2009 USD million)




Table D.11. 2009 non-core multilateral ODA by region, sector and fragility status (In 2009 USD million)

	Denmark	
Bilateral, unallocated / unspecified	24	23%
Country / region specific	82	77%
- of which regional allocations	17	
REGIONS		
South of Sahara	43	52%
North of Sahara	-	0%
Africa, regional multi-country	17	20%
Middle East	10	12%
Far East Asia	0	0%
South & Central Asia	11	14%
Asia, regional multi-country	-	0%
Oceania	-	0%
South America	0	0%
North & Central America	-	0%
America, regional multi-country	0	0%
Europe	1	1%
SECTORS		
Agriculture	2	2%
Developmental Food Aid	16	15%
Economic Infrastructure and Services	0	0%
Education	8	7%
Environment	22	21%
General Budget Support	-	0%
Government and Civil Society	6	5%
Health	4	4%
Humanitarian Aid	43	40%
Multi-sector	1	1%
Other Production Sectors (forestry, fishing, industry, mining, construction, trade policy, tourism)	3	3%
Other Social infrastructure	1	1%
Population Policies and Reproductive Health	-	0%
Water Supply and Sanitation	0	0%
Other (admin., promotion development awareness, refugees in donor countries)	-	0.0%
FRAGILE / CONFLICT*		
Fragile	60	93%
Other	5	7%

European Union Institutions

Table D.12. 2009 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(Gross disbursements in 2009 USD million)

	Core Contributions	Non-Core Contributions
World Bank Group	-	383
UN Funds and Programmes	92	1,104
<i>of which:</i>		
UNDP	-	391
WFP	-	308
UNICEF	-	124
UNFPA	-	7
UNHCR	-	118
UNRWA	92	122
Other UN	37	515
<i>of which:</i>		
FAO	1	262
IFAD	33	40
ILO	-	20
OHCHR	-	-
UNDPKO	-	-
UNECE	-	0
UNESCO	-	9
UN	-	20
UNOCHA	n/a	16
WHO	-	41
Regional Development Banks	15	112
Other multilaterals	279	201
Total	422	2,498

Figure D.6. 2009 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(Gross disbursements in 2009 USD million)




Table D.13. 2009 non-core multilateral ODA by region, sector and fragility status (In 2009 USD million)

	EU Institutions	
Bilateral, unallocated / unspecified	394	16%
Country / region specific	2,104	84%
- of which regional allocations	34	
REGIONS		
South of Sahara	905	43%
North of Sahara	80	4%
Africa, regional multi-country	26	1%
Middle East	202	10%
Far East Asia	133	6%
South & Central Asia	407	19%
Asia, regional multi-country	8	0%
Oceania	5	0%
South America	38	2%
North & Central America	80	4%
America, regional multi-country	-	0%
Europe	220	10%
SECTORS		
Agriculture	353	14%
Developmental Food Aid	283	11%
Economic Infrastructure and Services	144	6%
Education	47	2%
Environment	43	2%
General Budget Support	2	0%
Government and Civil Society	484	19%
Health	83	3%
Humanitarian Aid	664	27%
Multi-sector	130	5%
Other Production Sectors (forestry, fishing, industry, mining, construction, trade policy, tourism)	104	4%
Other Social infrastructure	88	4%
Population Policies and Reproductive Health	11	0%
Water Supply and Sanitation	60	2%
Other (admin., promotion development awareness, refugees in donor countries)	2	0.1%
FRAGILE / CONFLICT*		
Fragile	966	47%
Other	1,103	53%

Finland

Table D.14. 2009 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(Gross disbursements in 2009 USD million)

	Core	Non-core
EU institutions	216	28
World Bank Group	61	33
UN Funds and Programmes	103	62
<i>of which:</i>		
UNDP	26	10
WFP	8	18
UNICEF	23	8
UNFPA	29	3
UNHCR	10	16
UNRWA	6	3
Other UN	42	71
<i>of which:</i>		
FAO	2	8
IFAD	4	1
ILO	0	-
OHCHR	-	1
UNDPKO	2	10
UNECE	-	-
UNESCO	1	3
UN	2	-
UNOCHA	n/a	8
WHO	2	12
Regional Development Banks	48	7
Other multilaterals	29	21
Total	499	222

Figure D.7. 2009 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(Gross disbursements in 2009 USD million)




Table D.15. 2009 non-core multilateral ODA by region, sector and fragility status (In 2009 USD million)

	Finland	
Bilateral, unallocated / unspecified	73	33%
Country / region specific	150	67%
- of which regional allocations	27	
REGIONS		
South of Sahara	45	30%
North of Sahara	1	1%
Africa, regional multi-country	18	12%
Middle East	13	9%
Far East Asia	12	8%
South & Central Asia	34	23%
Asia, regional multi-country	9	6%
Oceania	-	0%
South America	2	1%
North & Central America	2	1%
America, regional multi-country	-	0%
Europe	14	9%
SECTORS		
Agriculture	5	2%
Developmental Food Aid	-	0%
Economic Infrastructure and Services	11	5%
Education	3	2%
Environment	8	4%
General Budget Support	-	0%
Government and Civil Society	61	28%
Health	6	3%
Humanitarian Aid	70	32%
Multi-sector	25	11%
Other Production Sectors (forestry, fishing, industry, mining, construction, trade policy, tourism)	20	9%
Other Social infrastructure	6	3%
Population Policies and Reproductive Health	2	1%
Water Supply and Sanitation	5	2%
Other (admin., promotion development awareness, refugees in donor countries)	0	0.0%
FRAGILE / CONFLICT*		
Fragile	69	57%
Other	53	43%

France

Table D.16. 2009 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(Gross disbursements in 2009 USD million)

	Core	Non-core
EU institutions	2,900	3
World Bank Group	632	10
UN Funds and Programmes	83	27
of which:		
UNDP	36	4
WFP	-	17
UNICEF	14	1
UNFPA	3	-
UNHCR	22	2
UNRWA	8	3
Other UN	179	4
of which:		
FAO	16	-
IFAD	11	-
ILO	14	4
OHCHR	2	-
UNDPKO	32	-
UNECE	-	-
UNESCO	14	-
UN	19	-
UNOCHA	n/a	-
WHO	27	0
Regional Development Banks	216	4
Other multilaterals	1,515	1
Total	5,526	49

Figure D.8. 2009 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(Gross disbursements in 2009 USD million)




Table D.17. 2009 non-core multilateral ODA by region, sector and fragility status (In 2009 USD million)

	France	
Bilateral, unallocated / unspecified	1	1%
Country / region specific	48	99%
- of which regional allocations	6	
REGIONS		
South of Sahara	18	37%
North of Sahara	-	0%
Africa, regional multi-country	6	12%
Middle East	10	22%
Far East Asia	1	2%
South & Central Asia	8	17%
Asia, regional multi-country	-	0%
Oceania	-	0%
South America	-	0%
North & Central America	1	3%
America, regional multi-country	-	0%
Europe	3	7%
SECTORS		
Agriculture	1	2%
Developmental Food Aid	30	62%
Economic Infrastructure and Services	5	10%
Education	-	0%
Environment	-	0%
General Budget Support	-	0%
Government and Civil Society	5	11%
Health	-	0%
Humanitarian Aid	2	5%
Multi-sector	-	0%
Other Production Sectors (forestry, fishing, industry, mining, construction, trade policy, tourism)	1	2%
Other Social infrastructure	4	8%
Population Policies and Reproductive Health	-	0%
Water Supply and Sanitation	-	0%
Other (admin., promotion development awareness, refugees in donor countries)	-	0.0%
FRAGILE / CONFLICT*		
Fragile	33	78%
Other	10	22%

Germany

Table D.18. 2009 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(Gross disbursements in 2009 USD million)

	Core	Non-core
EU institutions	2,891	14
World Bank Group	1,030	50
UN Funds and Programmes	95	154
<i>of which:</i>		
UNDP	38	46
WFP	-	89
UNICEF	9	1
UNFPA	25	3
UNHCR	11	6
UNRWA	11	2
Other UN	306	65
<i>of which:</i>		
FAO	22	13
IFAD	33	-
ILO	19	7
OHCHR	4	1
UNDPKO	26	-
UNECE	0	0
UNESCO	18	1
UN	26	2
UNOCHA	n/a	21
WHO	53	5
Regional Development Banks	278	1
Other multilaterals	426	133
Total	5,026	417

Figure D.9. 2009 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(Gross disbursements in 2009 USD million)




Table D.19. 2009 non-core multilateral ODA by region, sector and fragility status (In 2009 USD million)

	Germany	
Bilateral, unallocated / unspecified	136	33%
Country / region specific	281	67%
- of which regional allocations	10	
REGIONS		
South of Sahara	78	28%
North of Sahara	15	5%
Africa, regional multi-country	10	4%
Middle East	27	10%
Far East Asia	13	5%
South & Central Asia	121	43%
Asia, regional multi-country	0	0%
Oceania	-	0%
South America	2	1%
North & Central America	3	1%
America, regional multi-country	0	0%
Europe	12	4%
SECTORS		
Agriculture	35	8%
Developmental Food Aid	33	8%
Economic Infrastructure and Services	23	6%
Education	9	2%
Environment	19	5%
General Budget Support	-	0%
Government and Civil Society	126	30%
Health	7	2%
Humanitarian Aid	134	32%
Multi-sector	7	2%
Other Production Sectors (forestry, fishing, industry, mining, construction, trade policy, tourism)	6	2%
Other Social infrastructure	8	2%
Population Policies and Reproductive Health	7	2%
Water Supply and Sanitation	1	0%
Other (admin., promotion development awareness, refugees in donor countries)	-	0.0%
FRAGILE / CONFLICT*		
Fragile	182	67%
Other	89	33%

Greece

Table D.20. 2009 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(Gross disbursements in 2009 USD million)

	Core	Non-core
EU institutions	286	-
World Bank Group	-	-
UN Funds and Programmes	2	10
<i>of which:</i>		
UNDP	0	-
WFP	-	5
UNICEF	0	1
UNFPA	0	-
UNHCR	2	1
UNRWA	0	5
Other UN	11	1
<i>of which:</i>		
FAO	1	-
IFAD	-	0
ILO	-	0
OHCHR	-	-
UNDPKO	2	-
UNECE	0	-
UNESCO	1	-
UN	2	-
UNOCHA	n/a	-
WHO	2	-
Regional Development Banks	1	-
Other multilaterals	10	2
Total	310	14

Figure D.10. 2009 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(Gross disbursements in 2009 USD million)




Table D.21. 2009 non-core multilateral ODA by region, sector and fragility status (In 2009 USD million)

	Greece	
Bilateral, unallocated / unspecified	2	13%
Country / region specific	12	87%
- of which regional allocations	-	-
REGIONS		
South of Sahara	4	35%
North of Sahara	1	6%
Africa, regional multi-country	-	0%
Middle East	5	45%
Far East Asia	-	0%
South & Central Asia	1	12%
Asia, regional multi-country	-	0%
Oceania	-	0%
South America	-	0%
North & Central America	0	0%
America, regional multi-country	-	0%
Europe	0	2%
SECTORS		
Agriculture	1	9%
Developmental Food Aid	0	0%
Economic Infrastructure and Services	-	0%
Education	3	19%
Environment	0	0%
General Budget Support	-	0%
Government and Civil Society	1	5%
Health	2	14%
Humanitarian Aid	6	43%
Multi-sector	-	0%
Other Production Sectors (forestry, fishing, industry, mining, construction, trade policy, tourism)	1	5%
Other Social infrastructure	0	3%
Population Policies and Reproductive Health	-	0%
Water Supply and Sanitation	-	0%
Other (admin., promotion development awareness, refugees in donor countries)	0	1.1%
FRAGILE / CONFLICT*		
Fragile	9	73%
Other	3	27%

Ireland

Table D.22. 2009 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(Gross disbursements in 2009 USD million)

	Core	Non-core
EU institutions	163	-
World Bank Group	25	36
UN Funds and Programmes	55	53
<i>of which:</i>		
UNDP	12	24
WFP	14	12
UNICEF	11	11
UNFPA	4	-
UNHCR	8	4
UNRWA	5	2
Other UN	21	43
<i>of which:</i>		
FAO	2	1
IFAD	3	-
ILO	0	1
OHCHR	-	3
UNDPKO	2	-
UNECE	-	-
UNESCO	1	0
UN	2	2
UNOCHA	n/a	8
WHO	2	1
Regional Development Banks	15	-
Other multilaterals	32	9
Total	313	141

Figure D.11. 2009 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(Gross disbursements in 2009 USD million)




Table D.23. 2009 non-core multilateral ODA by region, sector and fragility status (In 2009 USD million)

	Ireland	
Bilateral, unallocated / unspecified	28	20%
Country / region specific	113	80%
- of which regional allocations	11	
REGIONS		
South of Sahara	80	70%
North of Sahara	-	0%
Africa, regional multi-country	8	7%
Middle East	4	3%
Far East Asia	11	10%
South & Central Asia	4	4%
Asia, regional multi-country	3	3%
Oceania	-	0%
South America	0	0%
North & Central America	2	2%
America, regional multi-country	-	0%
Europe	1	1%
SECTORS		
Agriculture	7	5%
Developmental Food Aid	2	1%
Economic Infrastructure and Services	-	0%
Education	12	9%
Environment	0	0%
General Budget Support	0	0%
Government and Civil Society	15	10%
Health	12	8%
Humanitarian Aid	61	44%
Multi-sector	3	2%
Other Production Sectors (forestry, fishing, industry, mining, construction, trade policy, tourism)	-	0%
Other Social infrastructure	20	14%
Population Policies and Reproductive Health	9	6%
Water Supply and Sanitation	0	0%
Other (admin., promotion development awareness, refugees in donor countries)	0	0.1%
FRAGILE / CONFLICT*		
Fragile	64	62%
Other	39	38%

Italy

Table D.24. 2009 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(Gross disbursements in 2009 USD million)

	Core	Non-core
EU institutions	1,862	-
World Bank Group	270	23
UN Funds and Programmes	52	47
<i>of which:</i>		
UNDP	6	13
WFP	21	9
UNICEF	11	11
UNFPA	1	0
UNHCR	7	7
UNRWA	7	3
Other UN	164	10
<i>of which:</i>		
FAO	14	2
IFAD	32	-
ILO	6	-
OHCHR	0	-
UNDPKO	15	0
UNECE	0	-
UNESCO	2	-
UN	14	-
UNOCHA	n/a	-
WHO	27	2
Regional Development Banks	24	-
Other multilaterals	63	54
Total	2,434	134

Figure D.12. 2009 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(Gross disbursements in 2009 USD million)




Table D.25. 2009 non-core multilateral ODA by region, sector and fragility status (In 2009 USD million)

	Italy	
Bilateral, unallocated / unspecified	32	24%
Country / region specific	102	76%
- of which regional allocations	1	
REGIONS		
South of Sahara	45	45%
North of Sahara	3	3%
Africa, regional multi-country	0	0%
Middle East	17	17%
Far East Asia	1	1%
South & Central Asia	26	25%
Asia, regional multi-country	1	1%
Oceania	-	0%
South America	2	2%
North & Central America	2	2%
America, regional multi-country	0	0%
Europe	3	3%
SECTORS		
Agriculture	3	2%
Developmental Food Aid	1	1%
Economic Infrastructure and Services	4	3%
Education	45	33%
Environment	4	3%
General Budget Support	-	0%
Government and Civil Society	18	14%
Health	17	13%
Humanitarian Aid	30	22%
Multi-sector	2	2%
Other Production Sectors (forestry, fishing, industry, mining, construction, trade policy, tourism)	1	1%
Other Social infrastructure	6	4%
Population Policies and Reproductive Health	-	0%
Water Supply and Sanitation	3	2%
Other (admin., promotion development awareness, refugees in donor countries)	1	0.4%
FRAGILE / CONFLICT*		
Fragile	78	78%
Other	23	22%

Japan

Table D.26. 2009 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(Gross disbursements in 2009 USD million)

	Core	Non-core
World Bank Group	1,404	0
UN Funds and Programmes	160	539
<i>of which:</i>		
UNDP	76	50
WFP	7	233
UNICEF	15	122
UNFPA	31	1
UNHCR	28	81
UNRWA	3	14
Other UN	525	23
<i>of which:</i>		
FAO	41	4
IFAD	34	-
ILO	36	-
OHCHR	1	-
UNDPKO	71	-
UNECE	-	-
UNESCO	31	-
UN	55	-
UNOCHA	n/a	-
WHO	70	-
Regional Development Banks	751	-
Other multilaterals	472	151
Total	3,313	713

Figure D.13. 2009 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(Gross disbursements in 2009 USD million)




Table D.27. 2009 non-core multilateral ODA by region, sector and fragility status (In 2009 USD million)

	Japan	
Bilateral, unallocated / unspecified	2	0%
Country / region specific	712	100%
- of which regional allocations	103	
REGIONS		
South of Sahara	328	46%
North of Sahara	-	0%
Africa, regional multi-country	87	12%
Middle East	44	6%
Far East Asia	23	3%
South & Central Asia	182	26%
Asia, regional multi-country	16	2%
Oceania	17	2%
South America	6	1%
North & Central America	8	1%
America, regional multi-country	-	0%
Europe	0	0%
SECTORS		
Agriculture	24	3%
Developmental Food Aid	215	30%
Economic Infrastructure and Services	0	0%
Education	40	6%
Environment	0	0%
General Budget Support	-	0%
Government and Civil Society	47	7%
Health	107	15%
Humanitarian Aid	167	23%
Multi-sector	4	1%
Other Production Sectors (forestry, fishing, industry, mining, construction, trade policy, tourism)	91	13%
Other Social infrastructure	10	1%
Population Policies and Reproductive Health	1	0%
Water Supply and Sanitation	6	1%
Other (admin., promotion development awareness, refugees in donor countries)	-	0.0%
FRAGILE / CONFLICT*		
Fragile	497	82%
Other	111	18%

Korea

Table D.28. 2009 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(Gross disbursements in 2009 USD million)

	Core	Non-core
World Bank Group	93	1
UN Funds and Programmes	9	15
<i>of which:</i>		
UNDP	4	2
WFP	0	7
UNICEF	3	2
UNFPA	0	0
UNHCR	3	1
UNRWA	0	-
Other UN	47	13
<i>of which:</i>		
FAO	5	0
IFAD	1	0
ILO	5	1
OHCHR	-	0
UNDPKO	6	-
UNECE	-	-
UNESCO	4	1
UN	6	0
UNOCHA	n/a	-
WHO	7	3
Regional Development Banks	69	6
Other multilaterals	17	13
Total	235	50

Figure D.14. 2009 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(Gross disbursements in 2009 USD million)




Table D.29. 2009 non-core multilateral ODA by region, sector and fragility status (In 2009 USD million)

	Korea	
Bilateral, unallocated / unspecified	14	29%
Country / region specific	35	71%
- of which regional allocations	12	
REGIONS		
South of Sahara	6	17%
North of Sahara	-	0%
Africa, regional multi-country	5	15%
Middle East	3	8%
Far East Asia	3	8%
South & Central Asia	7	20%
Asia, regional multi-country	6	17%
Oceania	0	1%
South America	0	0%
North & Central America	-	0%
America, regional multi-country	1	1%
Europe	4	12%
SECTORS		
Agriculture	1	1%
Developmental Food Aid	-	0%
Economic Infrastructure and Services	1	3%
Education	1	2%
Environment	5	10%
General Budget Support	-	0%
Government and Civil Society	6	12%
Health	3	7%
Humanitarian Aid	10	20%
Multi-sector	18	35%
Other Production Sectors (forestry, fishing, industry, mining, construction, trade policy, tourism)	0	0%
Other Social infrastructure	2	4%
Population Policies and Reproductive Health	1	2%
Water Supply and Sanitation	0	1%
Other (admin., promotion development awareness, refugees in donor countries)	1	2.7%
FRAGILE / CONFLICT*		
Fragile	5	20%
Other	19	80%

Luxembourg

Table D.30. 2009 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(Gross disbursements in 2009 USD million)

	Core	Non-core
EU institutions	40	2
World Bank Group	24	1
UN Funds and Programmes	36	33
of which:		
UNDP	10	8
WFP	4	8
UNICEF	8	3
UNFPA	7	4
UNHCR	3	8
UNRWA	4	2
Other UN	54	10
of which:		
FAO	0	5
IFAD	0	1
ILO	-	1
OHCHR	-	0
UNDPKO	-	0
UNECE	-	-
UNESCO	0	-
UN	-	0
UNOCHA	n/a	-
WHO	11	1
Regional Development Banks	6	1
Other multilaterals	10	0
Total	170	48

Figure D.15. 2009 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(Gross disbursements in 2009 USD million)




Table D.31. 2009 non-core multilateral ODA by region, sector and fragility status (In 2009 USD million)

	Luxembourg	
Bilateral, unallocated / unspecified	3	7%
Country / region specific	44	93%
- of which regional allocations	2	
REGIONS		
South of Sahara	23	52%
North of Sahara	-	0%
Africa, regional multi-country	2	4%
Middle East	2	5%
Far East Asia	8	17%
South & Central Asia	4	8%
Asia, regional multi-country	-	0%
Oceania	-	0%
South America	1	2%
North & Central America	2	4%
America, regional multi-country	-	0%
Europe	4	8%
SECTORS		
Agriculture	3	6%
Developmental Food Aid	1	2%
Economic Infrastructure and Services	-	0%
Education	0	0%
Environment	3	6%
General Budget Support	-	0%
Government and Civil Society	3	7%
Health	5	10%
Humanitarian Aid	19	40%
Multi-sector	7	16%
Other Production Sectors (forestry, fishing, industry, mining, construction, trade policy, tourism)	-	0%
Other Social infrastructure	1	3%
Population Policies and Reproductive Health	4	9%
Water Supply and Sanitation	-	0%
Other (admin., promotion development awareness, refugees in donor countries)	0	0.1%
FRAGILE / CONFLICT*		
Fragile	14	33%
Other	28	67%

Netherlands

Table D.32. 2009 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(Gross disbursements in 2009 USD million)

	Core	Non-core
EU institutions	577	15
World Bank Group	219	270
UN Funds and Programmes	409	433
of which:		
UNDP	129	204
WFP	56	20
UNICEF	50	125
UNFPA	87	51
UNHCR	58	20
UNRWA	29	0
Other UN	182	151
of which:		
FAO	5	13
IFAD	27	4
ILO	14	9
OHCHR	12	-
UNDPKO	-	-
UNECE	-	-
UNESCO	1	7
UN	7	1
UNOCHA	n/a	85
WHO	27	0
Regional Development Banks	76	37
Other multilaterals	166	52
Total	1,628	957

Figure D.16. 2009 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(Gross disbursements in 2009 USD million)




Table D.33. 2009 non-core multilateral ODA by region, sector and fragility status (In 2009 USD million)

	Netherlands	
Bilateral, unallocated / unspecified	322	34%
Country / region specific	635	66%
- of which regional allocations	9	
REGIONS		
South of Sahara	262	41%
North of Sahara	2	0%
Africa, regional multi-country	5	1%
Middle East	27	4%
Far East Asia	131	21%
South & Central Asia	151	24%
Asia, regional multi-country	4	1%
Oceania	-	0%
South America	7	1%
North & Central America	13	2%
America, regional multi-country	-	0%
Europe	33	5%
SECTORS		
Agriculture	23	2%
Developmental Food Aid	23	2%
Economic Infrastructure and Services	92	10%
Education	111	12%
Environment	16	2%
General Budget Support	13	1%
Government and Civil Society	206	22%
Health	20	2%
Humanitarian Aid	257	27%
Multi-sector	43	4%
Other Production Sectors (forestry, fishing, industry, mining, construction, trade policy, tourism)	7	1%
Other Social infrastructure	7	1%
Population Policies and Reproductive Health	58	6%
Water Supply and Sanitation	78	8%
Other (admin., promotion development awareness, refugees in donor countries)	4	0.4%
FRAGILE / CONFLICT*		
Fragile	377	60%
Other	249	40%

New Zealand

Table D.34. 2009 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(Gross disbursements in 2009 USD million)

	Core	Non-core
EU institutions	-	-
World Bank Group	12	1
UN Funds and Programmes	25	8
<i>of which:</i>		
UNDP	5	6
WFP	8	-
UNICEF	4	2
UNFPA	4	1
UNHCR	4	-
UNRWA	1	-
Other UN	19	6
<i>of which:</i>		
FAO	1	1
IFAD	-	-
ILO	0	0
OHCHR	1	-
UNDPKO	1	-
UNECE	-	-
UNESCO	1	1
UN	1	-
UNOCHA	n/a	-
WHO	1	3
Regional Development Banks	6	0
Other multilaterals	22	7
Total	83	23

Figure D.17. 2009 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(Gross disbursements in 2009 USD million)




Table D.35. 2009 non-core multilateral ODA by region, sector and fragility status (In 2009 USD million)

	New Zealand	
Bilateral, unallocated / unspecified	1	3%
Country / region specific	22	97%
- of which regional allocations	0	
REGIONS		
South of Sahara	-	0%
North of Sahara	-	0%
Africa, regional multi-country	-	0%
Middle East	-	0%
Far East Asia	6	26%
South & Central Asia	2	10%
Asia, regional multi-country	0	2%
Oceania	13	58%
South America	1	4%
North & Central America	-	0%
America, regional multi-country	-	0%
Europe	-	0%
SECTORS		
Agriculture	1	4%
Developmental Food Aid	-	0%
Economic Infrastructure and Services	1	6%
Education	3	12%
Environment	0	0%
General Budget Support	-	0%
Government and Civil Society	6	28%
Health	4	16%
Humanitarian Aid	2	7%
Multi-sector	1	4%
Other Production Sectors (forestry, fishing, industry, mining, construction, trade policy, tourism)	3	15%
Other Social infrastructure	0	1%
Population Policies and Reproductive Health	1	6%
Water Supply and Sanitation	0	1%
Other (admin., promotion development awareness, refugees in donor countries)	-	0.0%
FRAGILE / CONFLICT*		
Fragile	3	15%
Other	18	85%

Norway

Table D.36. 2009 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(Gross disbursements in 2009 USD million)

	Core	Non-core
World Bank Group	141	266
UN Funds and Programmes	354	399
<i>of which:</i>		
UNDP	123	198
WFP	26	12
UNICEF	72	135
UNFPA	53	12
UNHCR	46	18
UNRWA	34	3
Other UN	219	191
<i>of which:</i>		
FAO	2	24
IFAD	11	1
ILO	0	-
OHCHR	-	6
UNDPKO	-	1
UNECE	-	0
UNESCO	9	3
UN	2	0
UNOCHA	n/a	62
WHO	37	23
Regional Development Banks	89	46
Other multilaterals	183	75
Total	986	977

Figure D.18. 2009 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(Gross disbursements in 2009 USD million)




Table D.37. 2009 non-core multilateral ODA by region, sector and fragility status (In 2009 USD million)

	Norway	
Bilateral, unallocated / unspecified	504	52%
Country / region specific	473	48%
- of which regional allocations	63	
REGIONS		
South of Sahara	149	31%
North of Sahara	0	0%
Africa, regional multi-country	49	10%
Middle East	68	14%
Far East Asia	16	3%
South & Central Asia	140	30%
Asia, regional multi-country	9	2%
Oceania	-	0%
South America	9	2%
North & Central America	9	2%
America, regional multi-country	4	1%
Europe	19	4%
SECTORS		
Agriculture	20	2%
Developmental Food Aid	1	0%
Economic Infrastructure and Services	42	4%
Education	145	15%
Environment	84	9%
General Budget Support	60	6%
Government and Civil Society	198	20%
Health	63	6%
Humanitarian Aid	132	13%
Multi-sector	62	6%
Other Production Sectors (forestry, fishing, industry, mining, construction, trade policy, tourism)	101	10%
Other Social infrastructure	30	3%
Population Policies and Reproductive Health	18	2%
Water Supply and Sanitation	19	2%
Other (admin., promotion development awareness, refugees in donor countries)	0	0.0%
FRAGILE / CONFLICT*		
Fragile	293	71%
Other	117	29%

Portugal

Table D.38. 2009 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(Gross disbursements in 2009 USD million)

	Core	Non-core
EU institutions	189	0
World Bank Group	3	-
UN Funds and Programmes	5	0
of which:		
UNDP	3	-
WFP	-	-
UNICEF	0	-
UNFPA	0	-
UNHCR	2	-
UNRWA	-	0
Other UN	8	48
of which:		
FAO	1	-
IFAD	-	-
ILO	-	-
OHCHR	-	-
UNDPKO	1	46
UNECE	-	-
UNESCO	1	-
UN	2	-
UNOCHA	n/a	-
WHO	2	-
Regional Development Banks	24	-
Other multilaterals	8	1
Total	236	50

Figure D.19. 2009 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(Gross disbursements in 2009 USD million)




Table D.39. 2009 non-core multilateral ODA by region, sector and fragility status (In 2009 USD million)

	Portugal	
Bilateral, unallocated / unspecified	0	0%
Country / region specific	50	100%
- of which regional allocations	1	
REGIONS		
South of Sahara	1	2%
North of Sahara	0	0%
Africa, regional multi-country	-	0%
Middle East	9	19%
Far East Asia	13	26%
South & Central Asia	12	23%
Asia, regional multi-country	-	0%
Oceania	-	0%
South America	-	0%
North & Central America	-	0%
America, regional multi-country	1	2%
Europe	14	27%
SECTORS		
Agriculture	-	0%
Developmental Food Aid	-	0%
Economic Infrastructure and Services	-	0%
Education	-	0%
Environment	0	0%
General Budget Support	-	0%
Government and Civil Society	48	97%
Health	-	0%
Humanitarian Aid	0	0%
Multi-sector	1	3%
Other Production Sectors (forestry, fishing, industry, mining, construction, trade policy, tourism)	-	0%
Other Social infrastructure	0	0%
Population Policies and Reproductive Health	-	0%
Water Supply and Sanitation	-	0%
Other (admin., promotion development awareness, refugees in donor countries)	0	0.5%
FRAGILE / CONFLICT*		
Fragile	25	53%
Other	23	47%

Spain

Table D.40. 2009 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(Gross disbursements in 2009 USD million)

	Core	Non-core
EU institutions	1,235	37
World Bank Group	318	453
UN Funds and Programmes	173	445
<i>of which:</i>		
UNDP	75	109
WFP	21	162
UNICEF	31	78
UNFPA	20	27
UNHCR	15	20
UNRWA	11	11
Other UN	246	173
<i>of which:</i>		
FAO	7	63
IFAD	53	8
ILO	6	11
OHCHR	5	5
UNDPKO	10	-
UNECE	0	0
UNESCO	7	12
UN	11	-
UNOCHA	n/a	6
WHO	32	6
Regional Development Banks	117	89
Other multilaterals	66	148
Total	2,155	1,345

Figure D.20. 2009 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(Gross disbursements in 2009 USD million)




Table D.41. 2009 non-core multilateral ODA by region, sector and fragility status (In 2009 USD million)

	Spain	
Bilateral, unallocated / unspecified	292	22%
Country / region specific	1,053	78%
- of which regional allocations	346	
REGIONS		
South of Sahara	382	36%
North of Sahara	11	1%
Africa, regional multi-country	119	11%
Middle East	59	6%
Far East Asia	31	3%
South & Central Asia	105	10%
Asia, regional multi-country	15	1%
Oceania	0	0%
South America	50	5%
North & Central America	64	6%
America, regional multi-country	212	20%
Europe	5	1%
SECTORS		
Agriculture	46	3%
Developmental Food Aid	221	16%
Economic Infrastructure and Services	94	7%
Education	117	9%
Environment	82	6%
General Budget Support	26	2%
Government and Civil Society	164	12%
Health	35	3%
Humanitarian Aid	268	20%
Multi-sector	98	7%
Other Production Sectors (forestry, fishing, industry, mining, construction, trade policy, tourism)	12	1%
Other Social infrastructure	53	4%
Population Policies and Reproductive Health	41	3%
Water Supply and Sanitation	88	7%
Other (admin., promotion development awareness, refugees in donor countries)	1	0.1%
FRAGILE / CONFLICT*		
Fragile	390	55%
Other	316	45%

Sweden

Table D.42. 2009 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(Gross disbursements in 2009 USD million)

	Core	Non-core
EU institutions	298	28
World Bank Group	350	113
UN Funds and Programmes	411	319
<i>of which:</i>		
UNDP	94	148
WFP	64	11
UNICEF	73	87
UNFPA	59	12
UNHCR	81	26
UNRWA	40	9
Other UN	168	156
<i>of which:</i>		
FAO	3	19
IFAD	13	-
ILO	2	6
OHCHR	-	8
UNDPKO	3	8
UNECE	-	-
UNESCO	2	5
UN	4	-
UNOCHA	n/a	34
WHO	4	22
Regional Development Banks	167	63
Other multilaterals	145	160
Total	1,539	838

Figure D.21. 2009 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(Gross disbursements in 2009 USD million)




Table D.43. 2009 non-core multilateral ODA by region, sector and fragility status (In 2009 USD million)

	Sweden	
Bilateral, unallocated / unspecified	258	31%
Country / region specific	580	69%
- of which regional allocations	73	
REGIONS		
South of Sahara	192	33%
North of Sahara	-	0%
Africa, regional multi-country	37	6%
Middle East	35	6%
Far East Asia	36	6%
South & Central Asia	131	23%
Asia, regional multi-country	33	6%
Oceania	-	0%
South America	15	3%
North & Central America	16	3%
America, regional multi-country	3	1%
Europe	82	14%
SECTORS		
Agriculture	10	1%
Developmental Food Aid	1	0%
Economic Infrastructure and Services	58	7%
Education	50	6%
Environment	43	5%
General Budget Support	18	2%
Government and Civil Society	238	28%
Health	60	7%
Humanitarian Aid	184	22%
Multi-sector	59	7%
Other Production Sectors (forestry, fishing, industry, mining, construction, trade policy, tourism)	32	4%
Other Social infrastructure	15	2%
Population Policies and Reproductive Health	25	3%
Water Supply and Sanitation	30	4%
Other (admin., promotion development awareness, refugees in donor countries)	15	1.8%
FRAGILE / CONFLICT*		
Fragile	276	54%
Other	231	46%

Switzerland

Table D.44. 2009 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(Gross disbursements in 2009 USD million)

	Core	Non-core
World Bank Group	259	51
UN Funds and Programmes	108	80
<i>of which:</i>		
UNDP	50	16
WFP	2	40
UNICEF	18	5
UNFPA	13	1
UNHCR	12	13
UNRWA	13	2
Other UN	58	49
<i>of which:</i>		
FAO	3	4
IFAD	7	0
ILO	3	4
OHCHR	-	2
UNDPKO	4	2
UNECE	-	0
UNESCO	3	2
UN	3	-
UNOCHA	n/a	10
WHO	9	7
Regional Development Banks	66	17
Other multilaterals	77	44
Total	568	246

Figure D.22. 2009 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(Gross disbursements in 2009 USD million)




Table D.45. 2009 non-core multilateral ODA by region, sector and fragility status (In 2009 USD million)

	Switzerland	
Bilateral, unallocated / unspecified	64	26%
Country / region specific	183	74%
- of which regional allocations	9	
REGIONS		
South of Sahara	57	31%
North of Sahara	5	3%
Africa, regional multi-country	7	4%
Middle East	12	7%
Far East Asia	16	9%
South & Central Asia	53	29%
Asia, regional multi-country	1	1%
Oceania	0	0%
South America	6	3%
North & Central America	4	2%
America, regional multi-country	1	0%
Europe	21	11%
SECTORS		
Agriculture	9	4%
Developmental Food Aid	-	0%
Economic Infrastructure and Services	24	10%
Education	7	3%
Environment	8	3%
General Budget Support	9	4%
Government and Civil Society	55	22%
Health	7	3%
Humanitarian Aid	70	29%
Multi-sector	17	7%
Other Production Sectors (forestry, fishing, industry, mining, construction, trade policy, tourism)	14	6%
Other Social infrastructure	4	1%
Population Policies and Reproductive Health	0	0%
Water Supply and Sanitation	21	9%
Other (admin., promotion development awareness, refugees in donor countries)	1	0.5%
FRAGILE / CONFLICT*		
Fragile	71	41%
Other	103	59%

United Kingdom

Table D.46. 2009 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(Gross disbursements in 2009 USD million)

	Core	Non-core
EU institutions	1,944	57
World Bank Group	867	826
UN Funds and Programmes	211	801
<i>of which:</i>		
UNDP	43	437
WFP	-	118
UNICEF	33	182
UNFPA	66	22
UNHCR	30	13
UNRWA	39	9
Other UN	299	278
<i>of which:</i>		
FAO	17	10
IFAD	21	3
ILO	18	4
OHCHR	-	0
UNDPKO	31	1
UNECE	-	-
UNESCO	13	2
UN	19	3
UNOCHA	n/a	80
WHO	42	122
Regional Development Banks	269	33
Other multilaterals	346	496
Total	3,937	2,491

Figure D.23. 2009 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(Gross disbursements in 2009 USD million)




Table D.47. 2009 non-core multilateral ODA by region, sector and fragility status (In 2009 USD million)

	United Kingdom	
Bilateral, unallocated / unspecified	1,153	46%
Country / region specific	1,338	54%
- of which regional allocations	45	
REGIONS		
South of Sahara	730	55%
North of Sahara	-	0%
Africa, regional multi-country	44	3%
Middle East	78	6%
Far East Asia	124	9%
South & Central Asia	336	25%
Asia, regional multi-country	1	0%
Oceania	-	0%
South America	0	0%
North & Central America	22	2%
America, regional multi-country	-	0%
Europe	3	0%
SECTORS		
Agriculture	19	1%
Developmental Food Aid	4	0%
Economic Infrastructure and Services	247	10%
Education	72	3%
Environment	496	20%
General Budget Support	-	0%
Government and Civil Society	412	17%
Health	250	10%
Humanitarian Aid	531	21%
Multi-sector	54	2%
Other Production Sectors (forestry, fishing, industry, mining, construction, trade policy, tourism)	36	1%
Other Social infrastructure	216	9%
Population Policies and Reproductive Health	76	3%
Water Supply and Sanitation	76	3%
Other (admin., promotion development awareness, refugees in donor countries)	2	0.1%
FRAGILE / CONFLICT*		
Fragile	981	76%
Other	312	24%

United States

Table D.48. 2009 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(Gross disbursements in 2009 USD million)

	Core	Non-core
World Bank Group	1,209	490
UN Funds and Programmes	230	3,031
<i>of which:</i>		
UNDP	100	81
WFP	-	1,841
UNICEF	130	159
UNFPA	-	17
UNHCR	-	645
UNRWA	-	268
Other UN	614	406
<i>of which:</i>		
FAO	56	59
IFAD	18	-
ILO	48	49
OHCHR	8	-
UNDPKO	106	-
UNECE	-	-
UNESCO	47	1
UN	54	0
UNOCHA	n/a	32
WHO	81	222
Regional Development Banks	283	5
Other multilaterals	1,331	413
Total	3,667	4,345

Figure D.24. 2009 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(Gross disbursements in 2009 USD million)




Table D.49. 2009 non-core multilateral ODA by region, sector and fragility status (In 2009 USD million)

	United States	
Bilateral, unallocated / unspecified	537	12%
Country / region specific	3,808	88%
- of which regional allocations	23	
REGIONS		
South of Sahara	1,971	52%
North of Sahara	14	0%
Africa, regional multi-country	-	0%
Middle East	648	17%
Far East Asia	45	1%
South & Central Asia	791	21%
Asia, regional multi-country	6	0%
Oceania	0	0%
South America	71	2%
North & Central America	81	2%
America, regional multi-country	17	0%
Europe	163	4%
SECTORS		
Agriculture	75	2%
Developmental Food Aid	57	1%
Economic Infrastructure and Services	12	0%
Education	47	1%
Environment	31	1%
General Budget Support	-	0%
Government and Civil Society	604	14%
Health	242	6%
Humanitarian Aid	3,001	69%
Multi-sector	3	0%
Other Production Sectors (forestry, fishing, industry, mining, construction, trade policy, tourism)	6	0%
Other Social infrastructure	88	2%
Population Policies and Reproductive Health	147	3%
Water Supply and Sanitation	7	0%
Other (admin., promotion development awareness, refugees in donor countries)	25	0.6%
FRAGILE / CONFLICT*		
Fragile	2,965	78%
Other	820	22%